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This Article considers the scope of the Federal Reserve’s emergency 
loan-making powers and analyzes their use during the recent financial 
crisis.  It argues that many of the Fed’s responses to the crisis exceeded the 
bounds of its statutory authority. 
In unusual and exigent circumstances, § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act empowers the Fed to provide an uncapped amount of liquidity to the 
financial system.  It may, with the approval of the U.S. Treasury, establish 
programs of broad-based eligibility and lend freely against sufficient 
collateral.  Before its amendment by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, § 13(3) also allowed the Fed, acting alone, 
to extend credit to particular individuals, partnerships, and corporations.  
From 2008 to 2009, the Fed invoked this authority repeatedly to purchase 
assets, lend money, and establish schemes that sought to restore market 
stability.  However, this Article argues that § 13(3) was and remains a 
loan-making power of narrowly defined scope.  On this view, the Fed’s 
asset purchases and certain of its lending activities raise great concerns.   
The impact of these concerns has yet to be addressed in the literature. 
This Article first looks to the history of § 13(3) by tracing the 
development and use of the legislation.  It then examines the transactional 
structures that the Fed created during the crisis and assesses these against 
the scope of its § 13(3) powers.  Next, it evaluates the case for reform with 
which Congress was confronted, and its response in the Dodd-Frank Act.  
It concludes that the reforms to § 13(3) that the Act makes are to be 
welcomed overall, even though a key ambiguity remains in the statute.  
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Finally, it traces the Fed’s new authority in the area of systemic risk 
regulation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act is a powerful legislative 
provision.  At present, it empowers the Federal Reserve (the ―Fed‖), in 
unusual and exigent circumstances, to provide an uncapped amount of 
liquidity to the financial system.  With the approval of the Treasury, the 
Fed may establish programs of broad-based eligibility and lend freely 
against sufficient collateral. 
Before the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the ―Dodd-Frank Act‖), § 13(3) was broader in 
scope.  It permitted the Fed to provide credit to particular individuals, 
partnerships, and corporations.  During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, 
the Fed used § 13(3) extensively.  It made loans to some financial 
institutions and bought assets from others.  It established broader schemes, 
open to a number of institutions, in order to restore market stability.  And 
in at least one case, it refused to provide any credit, resulting in the failure 
of a major investment bank. 
This Article has two goals.  The first is to argue that many of the Fed‘s 
actions during the financial crisis exceeded the bounds of its statutory 
authority.  This argument has yet to receive any sustained analysis in the 
literature.  However, it is one with which Congress now appears to have 
agreed.  The Article‘s second goal is to evaluate the most recent reforms of 
§ 13(3) contained in the Dodd-Frank Act.  These have the express purpose 
of realigning the Fed‘s role with that of a lender of last resort.  They also 
seek to address various concerns about the scope of the Fed‘s authority. 
Parts II and III of this Article trace the use and development of § 13(3) 
from its enactment to the time of the financial crisis.  The purpose of Part 
IV is to set out the Fed‘s responses to the financial crisis and to analyze 
these against the scope of its § 13(3) powers. 
Part V then seeks to ascertain the intended purpose of § 13(3).  It 
considers the case for reform with which Congress was faced.  It then goes 
on to evaluate the changes to § 13(3) made by the Dodd-Frank Act in light 
of the legislature‘s vision for § 13(3) – secured lending against sufficient 
collateral – and the Fed‘s departure from that vision.  It examines an 
important ambiguity that remains in the statute.  And finally, it 
demonstrates that the Fed‘s assumed responsibility for resolving systemic 
solvency risks now lies primarily in the province of another entity. 
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II.  THE FED‘S POWERS: § 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 
In this Part, we will consider § 13(3) as it stood at the time of the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009.  This approach will allow us to evaluate the 
legality of the Fed‘s actions during this period.  Furthermore, when we 
come to assess the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act in Part V below, we will 
also be in a position to understand the key concerns to which Congress 
sought to respond. 
At the time of the financial crisis, § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 
(the ―FRA‖) provided: 
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less 
than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, 
during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates 
established in accordance with the provisions of section 357 of 
this title,
1
 to discount for any individual, partnership, or 
corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, 
drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to 
the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank:   Provided, that 
before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an 
individual or a partnership or corporation the Federal reserve 
bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or 
corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations 
from other banking institutions.  All such discounts for 
individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall be subject to such 
limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.
2
 
 
 1. 12 U.S.C. § 357 (2006).  Section 357 empowers Federal Reserve Banks to set rates 
of discount.  This provision states that each reserve bank may ―establish from time to time, 
subject to review and determination of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, rates of discount to be charged . . . for each class of paper, which shall be fixed with 
a view of accommodating commerce and business, but each such bank shall establish such 
rates every fourteen days, or oftener if deemed necessary by the Board.‖  § 357. 
 2. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).  With the exception of the 
word ―Provided,‖ all emphasis is added. 
For further discussion of § 13(3) and the other legal authority that the executive 
invoked during the crisis, see generally John M. Brandow et al., Davis Polk, Financial Crisis 
Manual, A Guide to the Laws, Regulations and Contracts of the Financial Crisis (2009), 
available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/d1ab7627-e45d-4d35-b6f1-
ef356ba686f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2a31cab4-3682-420e-926f-
054c72e3149d/fcm.pdf (providing an overview of the events of the financial crisis and 
describing the pre-reform U.S. laws, regulations, and contracts relevant to financial 
institutions); Thomas Porter, The Federal Reserve’s Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the 
Federal Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 483 available at 
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/journals/articles/85.pdf (discussing the legal basis for 
the Bear Stearns bailout and the policy issues raised thereby); Christian A. Johnson, Exigent 
 
224 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
This provision empowered the Fed to lend to ―any individual, 
partnership, or corporation.‖
3
  In more precise terms, the Fed could, in 
unusual and exigent circumstances, discount financial instruments for such 
individuals, partnerships, or corporations as were unable to secure 
adequate credit from other banks.
4
  The financial instruments had to be 
indorsed or otherwise secured.
5
  The process required the affirmative vote 
of not less than five members.
6
 We will consider each of these statutory 
requirements in turn.  Where appropriate, we will use the present tense to 
indicate features that remain in the statute. 
A.  Discounting 
Under § 13(3), the Fed
7
 could authorize its Reserve Banks to discount 
 
and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis, EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584731 (considering the Federal 
Reserve‘s responses to the crisis and assessing various options for reform); and Steven M. 
Davidoff & David T. Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (analyzing the way in which the government‘s 
deal-making during the financial crisis interacted with its legal authority). 
 3. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. The Federal Reserve System is the central banking system of the United States.  It 
comprises a group of Federal Reserve Banks, which are overseen by a Board of Governors. 
Banks with federal charters (―national banks‖) must join.  Banks with state charters (―state 
banks‖) may choose whether or not to join.  See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 222-223 (2010); 
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 12-13 
(4th ed. 2009).  The text that follows will use the term the ―Federal Reserve‖ and its 
abbreviation, the ―Fed‖, interchangeably.  However, references to the Fed‘s actions will 
refer primarily to those of its Board of Governors. 
The Federal Reserve Banks are the means by which the Fed operates the payment 
system and implements its decisions on monetary policy.  There is a Reserve Bank in each 
of twelve geographical districts in the United States.  12 U.S.C. §§ 222–223.  Each has a 
nine-member board of directors.  12 U.S.C. § 302.  Reserve Banks hold reserves on behalf 
of their member banks.  12 U.S.C. § 461.  Member banks, in turn, own shares in Reserve 
Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 321–323. 
The Board of Governors is an agency of the federal government.  It has seven 
members, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 12 U.S.C. § 
241.  The Board has two main functions.  First, it regulates state member banks and bank 
holding companies (and it oversees Reserve Banks).  12 U.S.C. § 248.  The Fed shares its 
regulatory role with other agencies.  The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
regulates national banks.  § 1.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates state 
nonmember banks.  12 U.S.C. § 266.  A number of state agencies also oversee state banks.  
CARNELL ET AL., supra, at 61-63.  Consumer protection is another facet of banking 
regulation.  The Fed has authority under certain statutes to promulgate regulations for this 
purpose.  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2010) (codifying Regulation Z, implementing the Truth 
in Lending Act); CARNELL ET AL., supra, at ch. 7. 
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certain financial instruments (notes, drafts, and bills of exchange) for any 
individual, partnership, or corporation.
8
  The process of discounting has a 
precise meaning in this context.  A discount is a loan.
9
  When a bank 
 
The Board‘s second function is to implement monetary policy.  It does so in two 
ways.  The first is by means of its open-market operations.  These involve the purchase and 
sale of U.S. government securities.  David H. Small & James A. Clouse, The Scope of 
Monetary Policy Actions Authorized Under the Federal Reserve Act 1 (FEDS Working 
Paper No. 2004-40, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622342. In this way, the 
Fed is able to increase or decrease, respectively, the amount of money available in the 
economy.  Id.  These operations are directed by the Federal Open Market Committee (which 
consists of Reserve Bank presidents and members of the Board).  12 U.S.C. § 263.  The 
second is by providing credit to banks at the discount window (which is operated by Reserve 
Banks).  
The discount window provisions are contained in Federal Reserve Act § 13(2) and 
certain other provisions of the Act.  These provisions indicate that Reserve Banks may make 
loans to banks against eligible collateral.  Small & Clouse, supra, at 11.  The term discount 
window should be distinguished from the process of discounting (i.e., loan-making).  This 
does take place at the discount window, but it need not.  It may also take place under the 
Federal Reserve Act § 13(3) (under which the collateral requirements are not so strict).  See 
infra note 10. 
 8. Section 13(3) is not the only provision under which the Fed can make loans to 
nonbanks.  12 U.S.C. § 347(c) permits lending to nonbanks so long as they provide Treasury 
or agency securities as collateral.  There is no requirement of unusual and exigent 
circumstances.  However, because of the demanding collateral requirement, this provision 
would be of limited use in such circumstances.  Small and Clouse point out that entities that 
hold such instruments could easily sell them in the open market.  Small & Clouse, supra 
note 7, at 14. 
 9. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (2nd ed. 1910), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=R2c8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA374.  Black‘s defines a 
discount as ―the taking of interest in advance.‖  Id.  (citing Fleckner v. Bank, 21 U. S. 338 
(1823) (―A discount by a bank means a ‗drawback or deduction made upon its advances or 
loans of money, upon negotiable paper or other evidences of debt . . . .‖); Weckler v. First 
Nat‘l Bank, 42 Md. 581, 592 (Md. 1875) (―The ordinary meaning of the term ‗to discount‘ 
is to take interest in advance, and in banking is a mode of loaning money.  It is the advance 
of money not due till some future period, less the interest which would be due thereon when 
payable.‖); and City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N.Y. 507, 515 (N.Y. 1858) 
(―Discounting of a note by a bank is understood to consist in the lending of money upon it, 
and deducting the interest or premium in advance.‖)).  The Dictionary also references Nat’l 
Bank v. Johnston, in which a discount was explained to be ―the difference between the price 
and the amount of the debt, the evidence of which is transferred.  That difference represents 
interest charged . . . .‖  104 U.S. 271, 276 (U.S. 1881).  Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 355 and discussion 
infra Part IV.A.1.ii (discussing purchases rather than discounts). 
Section 13(3) was enacted on July 21, 1932.  12 U.S.C. § 343.  The 1910 edition of 
Black‘s is the closest edition to this date that contains an entry for ―discount.‖  The term is 
not defined in the third edition (1933).  See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77 
(U.S. 1990) Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting on the facts) (―In construing any terms whose 
meanings are less than plain, we depend on the common understanding of those terms at the 
time of the statute‘s creation.‖) 
In Reves, the majority of the Court held that certain demand notes issued by the 
Farmer‘s Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma were securities within the meaning of § 
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Id. at 70.  Furthermore, the majority held 
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discounts a financial instrument for a borrower, it accepts that instrument 
as collateral and then lends out a sum of money that is less than the face 
value of the instrument.
10
  In this way, the bank obtains an interest payment 
in advance.
11
  There is a clear difference between a loan and an asset 
purchase.  In a secured loan transaction, the borrower receives a loan and 
provides collateral.  Ownership of this collateral remains in the borrower.  
The lender obtains only a security interest:  the right to have recourse to 
these assets if the borrower defaults.  In a purchase, on the other hand, the 
purchaser obtains ownership of an asset once the transaction has been 
completed.
12
 
 
that the exemption in that provision for ―any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker‘s 
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months‖ did 
not apply to demand notes, because demand could potentially be made ―many years or 
decades into the future.‖  Id. at 73.  In dicta, there is also some discussion, not of immediate 
relevance, as to whether this statutory exemption applies only to commercial paper.  Id. at 
70-71, 74-76, 79-82.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the minority, cited the third 
edition of Black‘s Law Dictionary and a legal treatise by Bigelow in support of the 
proposition that demand notes have an immediate maturity at the time of their issuance, and 
so come within the statutory exemption.  Id. at 77.  The majority rejected this argument, 
holding that that these sources articulated rules of state law, which could not provide an 
answer to the federal question before the Court.  Id. at 72.  In the present case, however, 
there is specific federal precedent as to the meaning of the term ―discount.‖ 
 10. Discounting for banks takes place at the discount window.  Discounting for 
nonbanks takes place under § 13(3).  When a Reserve Bank makes a discount at the discount 
window, it provides credit to a bank and takes as collateral ―eligible paper representing 
loans made by the [bank] to its own customers.‖  HOWARD HACKLEY, LENDING FUNCTIONS 
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY 83 (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 1973).  Eligible instruments are primarily those that are issued or used for 
agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes.  12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).  On the other 
hand, when a Reserve Bank makes a § 13(3) loan to a nonbank, the collateral requirements 
are not so strict.  See infra Part III.A. 
Certain instruments other than those set out in Federal Reserve Act § 13(2), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 343 (2006) are also eligible for discount at the discount window.  These are demand bills 
of exchange relating to the domestic shipment of agricultural goods, 12 U.S.C. § 344, 
acceptances relating to the shipment of goods and acceptances to create dollar exchanges, 12 
U.S.C. § 346, and notes drawn for an agricultural purpose, 12 U.S.C. § 348.  See also Small 
& Clouse, supra note 7, at 11 (discussing the permissible scope of discount-window 
lending). 
 11. The discount differs from the haircut that the bank applies to the value of the 
collateral.  The haircut compensates the bank for the risk of default.  Small & Clouse, supra 
note 7, at 13 n.29. 
 12. See Farmers & Mech. Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198, 206 (Minn. 1876) 
(―Discounting a note and buying it are not identical in meaning, the latter expression being 
used to denote the transaction ‗when the seller does not endorse the note, and is not 
accountable for it . . . .‘‖ (quoting 1 Bouv. Law Dict. title Discount, citing Pothier, De l‘ 
Usure, 128)). 
The point here is that when an instrument is discounted for a borrower (under a 
recourse loan transaction), he remains liable for any shortfall in the value of his collateral.  
When an instrument is purchased from a borrower, he is no longer liable for any shortfall.  
However, there is one case in which a loan can have the same effect as an asset purchase.  
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B. Notes, drafts, and bills of exchange 
Three types of financial instruments are eligible for discount under § 
13(3).  These are notes, drafts, and bills of exchange.  A note is an 
unconditional promise to pay.
13
  This is a two-party instrument in which A 
promises to pay B.
14
  Both drafts and bills of exchange, which are 
synonymous terms, constitute orders to pay.
15
  These are three-party 
instruments in which A orders that B make a payment to C.
16
  Notes, drafts, 
and bills of exchange are all credit instruments.  It has been stated that this 
list provides ―virtually no restrictions on the form a written credit 
instrument must take in order to be eligible for discount.‖
17
  However, 
corporate shares, which are not credit instruments, would appear to be 
ineligible for discount under § 13(3).
18
 
C. Unusual and exigent circumstances 
 A § 13(3) discount may only occur when circumstances are both 
unusual and exigent.  This appears to be an objective test.  The terms are 
not defined in the statute, but it is evident that they set a high threshold.  In 
the event that the Fed determines that unusual and exigent circumstances 
exist, there is no statutory requirement that it announce this publicly. A 
strong argument against such an obligation is that the announcement may 
have a negative effect on market confidence and so catalyze a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
19
 
 
This is when a bank makes a non-recourse loan to a borrower who defaults.  Here, the bank 
will end up with ownership of the collateral in the same way as if it had purchased it.  
However, there is a conceptual distinction between these two transactions.  In a loan 
transaction, the bank‘s goal at the outset is to lend money against the borrower‘s collateral, 
not to acquire it.  The bank makes the loan on the understanding that there is some chance 
that it will be repaid. 
 13. U.C.C. §§ 3-103, 3-104 (2005); 3 WEST‘S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 15–16 
(2nd ed. 2005);.  Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 26-27. 
 14. 3 WEST‘S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 15.  Here, A is the maker and B is the 
payee.  Id. 
 15. Id. at 16. 
 16. Id.  Here, A is the drawer, B is the drawee, and C is the payee.  A commonly used 
type of draft is a check, in which case a bank is the drawee.  Id. 
 17. Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 15. 
 18. Small and Clouse indicate that shares may constitute permissible collateral under § 
10B of the FRA.  Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 12.  However, this provision is 
concerned with the Fed‘s power to make an advance.  In the case of an advance, a borrower 
provides his own promissory note (rather than making a pledge of third-party indebtedness).  
See infra note 79. 
 19. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., The Legal Position 
of the Central Bank, The Case of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 6 (Jan. 19, 2009), 
http://lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/events/conferences/2009/regulatoryResponse/1160_Baxter.p
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D. For such individual, partnership, or corporation 
The Fed could lend to any individual, partnership, or corporation.
20
  It 
is important to emphasize a feature of the statutory language contained in 
the proviso.  Before extending credit to an individual, partnership, or 
corporation, the Reserve Bank had to obtain evidence that such individual, 
partnership, or corporation was unable to secure adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions.  Hence the recipient of 
the loan had to be the same party that was unable to obtain credit from 
elsewhere.
21
 
E. Unable to secure adequate credit from other banks 
Normally, a borrower is ―unable to secure adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions‖
22
 because circumstances 
are unusual and exigent – and so in practice, these two requirements are 
fulfilled together. 
F. Indorsed or otherwise secured 
Any financial instruments to be discounted must be indorsed 
(endorsed) or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank.  
The process of endorsement aims to provide the Bank with a measure of 
protection against loss.  When a party unqualifiedly endorses commercial 
paper, it assumes secondary liability on that paper.
23
  Following 
endorsement, the Bank can bring a claim against the endorser in the event 
 
df. 
 20. A subsidiary issue, as Gordon and Muller point out, is whether the Fed can lend to a 
limited liability company (as it did in some of the cases to be considered below).  Is this an 
individual, partnership, or corporation?  The LLC form did not exist when the statute was 
amended in 1932.  Even so, they look to the history of the bill, and note that it was expanded 
at a later stage to include ―partnership.‖  Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding 
Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management 41 (European 
Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper Series in Finance, Paper No. 277, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553880.  They suggest that ―corporation‖ should also 
be read broadly.  Id.  This approach seems persuasive. 
 21. But see infra Part IV.A.1.ii (considering the argument that ―such individual‖ may 
refer to not only the immediate borrower but also the beneficiary—the ultimate borrower). 
 22. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3). 
 23. WEST‘S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 13, at 20 (discussing the 
process of unqualified endorsement and explaining that secondary liability occurs ―when the 
individual who has the primary duty to pay defaults on his or her obligation.‖).  See also 
U.C.C. § 3-204 (2005) (indicating that by endorsing an instrument, a party may incur 
liability on that instrument); HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 129 (indicating that under § 13(3), 
banks can seek repayment by resort to security or the endorsement of a third party). 
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that the issuer of the paper does not pay.
24
 
An alternative way for a Reserve Bank to protect itself (and satisfy the 
statutory requirements) is to take some security for its loan.  The phrase 
―secured to the satisfaction of‖ indicates that a Reserve Bank has some 
measure of discretion in the collateral it chooses to accept.  But it does not 
follow that the Reserve Bank enjoys absolute discretion.  It would seem 
that the borrower has to provide some appropriate security for the loan.  If 
the Fed could make loans against no collateral, this would negate the 
statute‘s express reference to some security.
25
 
G. By the affirmative vote of not less than five members 
This requirement relates to the voting procedure.  At least five of the 
seven members of the Fed‘s Board of Governors must affirmatively vote to 
authorize the extension of credit by a Federal Reserve Bank. 
Another section of the statute, § 11(r), provides an alternative voting 
procedure for cases where fewer than five members of the Board are 
available.  If the Fed determines that emergency action is necessary to 
prevent serious harm to the financial system, there can instead be a 
unanimous vote by at least two members of the Board.  The Fed used this 
procedure in one case.
26
 
III. THE HISTORY OF § 13(3) 
We are now in a position to consider how § 13(3) developed and how 
it was used before the financial crisis.  The legislative history indicates that 
the provision as enacted contained three important restrictions.  These 
would have precluded many of the Fed‘s responses to the financial crisis, 
had they not been removed by a series of amendments.  The provision‘s 
historical use reflects a similar point.  Before 2008, the Fed used § 13(3) 
only sparingly.  Loans were made only from 1932 to 1936, and these were 
limited in number. 
 
 24. Id.  Can a borrower under § 13(3) endorse a note that it itself has issued?  It would 
appear not.  Such a transaction would constitute unsecured lending (backed only by the 
borrower‘s bare promise to pay).  This goes against the requirement that a loan be endorsed 
or secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank.  Furthermore, such a transaction 
resembles an advance.  See infra note 79. 
 25. But see infra Part IV.A.2 (assessing the argument that the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility constituted an example of unsecured lending under § 13(3)). 
 26. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed‘s overnight loan to 
Bear Stearns). 
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A. The legislative history of § 13(3) 
The Fed was first granted its § 13(3) lending powers by an amendment 
in the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932.
27
  Section 210 of 
this statute provided: 
Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, is further 
amended by adding after the second paragraph thereof the 
following new paragraph: 
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Federal Reserve 
Board, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may 
authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the 
said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with 
the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to 
discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, 
drafts, and bills of exchange of the kinds and maturities made 
eligible for discount for member banks under other provisions of 
this Act when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are 
indorsed and otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal 
reserve bank:  Provided, That before discounting any such note, 
draft, or bill of exchange for an individual or a partnership or 
corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that 
such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure 
adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.  
All such discounts for individuals, partnerships, or corporations 
shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations 
as the Federal Reserve Board may prescribe.
28
 
The first restriction in § 13(3) as enacted was that before a Federal 
Reserve Bank could discount a financial instrument, the instrument had to 
be ―indorsed and otherwise secured‖ to the Bank‘s satisfaction.  Even 
though the text appears to be both conjunctive and disjunctive (―and 
otherwise‖), it was arguable that the collateral had to be both endorsed and 
secured.  This constraint was modified by § 322 of the Banking Act of 
1935, which replaced ―and‖ with ―or.‖
29
  Thereafter, a Reserve Bank could 
accept either an endorsement or some security. 
The second restriction in § 13(3) as enacted was more significant.  A 
Federal Reserve Bank could discount for an individual only those financial 
instruments ―of the kinds and maturities made eligible for discount for 
member banks.‖
30
  This meant that loans to individuals, partnerships, and 
 
 27. Ch. 520, 47 Stat. 709 (1932) (providing for a public works program to create 
employment and extending the powers of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a 
government agency that made loans to banks and other companies). 
 28. Id.  With the exception of ―Provided,‖ all emphasis is added. 
 29. The Banking Act of 1935, 12 U.S.C. § 228 (1935). 
 30. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3). 
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corporations were subject to the same collateral requirements as loans to 
member banks. 
Lending to member banks takes place at a Reserve Bank‘s discount 
window.
31
  Under the Federal Reserve Act § 13(2), Reserve Banks may 
accept as collateral notes, drafts, and bills of exchange that have been 
―issued or drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes,‖ or 
that have proceeds that will be used for such purposes.
32
  Such instruments 
must have a maturity period of no more than ninety days.
33
  Furthermore, 
instruments ―issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in 
stocks, bonds or other securities,‖ other than Treasury securities, are 
expressly ineligible for discount. 
By specifying the collateral eligible for discount, the legislation as 
enacted limited the Fed‘s ability to extend credit to investment banks and 
other similar firms under § 13(3).  The majority of their assets consist of 
investment instruments, against which no loans could then be made. 
This constraint was abolished by § 473 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (the ―FDICIA‖).
34
  This provision 
 
 31. Federal Reserve Act § 19(e), 12 U.S.C. § 463 (1913) (stating that non-member 
banks could receive loans indirectly through member banks, but only with the Fed‘s 
permission).  Cf. Federal Reserve Act § 19(b), 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1913) (indicating that at 
present, all depositary institutions that hold transaction accounts are entitled to the same 
discount and borrowing privileges as member banks).  See also HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 
119 (discussing cases where the Fed expressly authorized member banks to obtain loans for 
nonmember banks). 
 32. Federal Reserve Act § 13(2), 12 U.S.C § 343 (2006).  The test for eligible paper 
under this provision looks to the nature of the underlying transaction rather than to the form 
of the paper.  Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 8 (citing HAROLD L. REED, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY (1922)).  There are in fact two tests for eligible 
paper under the statute.  Either the paper has its origins in a given commercial transaction 
(for example, where a company buys goods and provides its paper to the seller as payment), 
or the paper is subsequently used as collateral by another borrower who seeks funding for 
commercial purposes.  See WH Steiner, Paper Eligible for Rediscount at Federal Reserve 
Banks: Theories Underlying Federal Reserve Board Rulings, 34 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 327, 338-39 (1926) (stating that a paper may be eligible for discount ―because 
issued or drawn for an agricultural or commercial purpose‖, or ―because the proceeds have 
been or are to be used for an agricultural or commercial purpose‖). 
 33. See HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 14 (explaining that the reasoning behind the ninety-
day maturity period is that such paper is highly liquid and ―almost the exact equivalent of 
cash‖).  A longer maturity period applies to agricultural paper.  The reasoning that underlies 
the distinction is that agricultural loans are normally made for a period that corresponds to 
the crop season.  Id. at 43.  Hence § 13A(1) of the FRA provides for a nine-month maturity 
period for notes ―drawn for an agricultural purpose, or based upon live stock.‖  This 
provision was added to the FRA by the Agricultural Credits Act of 1923, which was enacted 
in response to a decrease in farm prices during the 1920s.  Id. at 44. 
 34. See Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 29 FED. RES. 
BANK OF CLEVELAND ECO. REV. 16, 19 (1993), available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Review/1993/93-q3-todd.pdf (stating that: 
[O]ne of the potentially troublesome aspects of the FDICIA amendment of 
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removed the phrase ―of the kinds and maturities made eligible for discount 
for member banks under other provisions of this Act‖ from § 13(3).
35
  As a 
result, all notes, drafts, and bills of exchange became eligible for discount, 
so long as they were endorsed or secured to the satisfaction of the Federal 
Reserve Bank. 
The third restriction was procedural.  Section 13(3) requires the 
affirmative approval of five of the Fed‘s Governors before a loan can be 
made.  As indicated above, though, an alternative voting procedure has 
since been enacted.  Section 11(r) states that there may instead be a 
unanimous vote of all (but at least two) available Fed Governors if the Fed 
determines that emergency action is necessary to prevent serious harm to 
the financial system.
36
  If certain documentary requirements were met, then 
this procedure was sufficient for action to be taken under § 13(3).
37
 
B. The Fed’s use of § 13(3) before the financial crisis 
The Fed‘s Board of Governors issued a circular on July 26, 1932, five 
days after § 13(3) was enacted.
38
  This became effective on August 1, 
1932.
39
  It gave Reserve Banks the authority for a period of six months to 
make loans under § 13(3).
40
  This initial period of authority was extended 
for successive six-month periods lasting until July 31, 1936.
41
 
The Fed did not prescribe any formal regulations.  Instead, in its 
circular, it outlined the legal and procedural requirements that borrowers 
 
Section 13 (3) is that it appears to reflect a motive or spirit that contradicts that 
of the FDICIA provisions intended both to limit Reserve Banks‘ loans to 
undercapitalized depository institutions and to make it more difficult for the 
Federal Reserve to treat an institution as too big to fail.  If the amendment was 
intended to provide a vehicle for possible Federal Reserve treatment of a failing 
securities firm as too big to fail, then it arguably constitutes a contradictory 
extension of the same federal safety net that was retrenched in other parts of 
FDICIA. . . .). 
 35. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 473, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1811 (1991). 
 36. Federal Reserve Act § 11(r), 12 U.S.C. § 248(r) (2006). 
 37. See id. (listing the various requirements, for example that the Board‘s ―written 
findings shall be included in the record of the action and in the official minutes of the Board, 
and copies of such record shall be provided as soon as practicable to the members of the 
Board who were not available to participate‖). 
 38. Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations, 18 FED. RES. BULL. 473, 
518 (Aug. 1932), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/frb/1932/download/51730/frb_081932.pdf. 
 39. Id. at 474. 
 40. Id. at 474, 518. 
 41. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, 
and Corporations, 22 FED. RES. BULL. 71, 123-24 (Feb. 1936), available at 
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/frb/1936/download/35757/frb_021936.pdf. 
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applying for credit from a Reserve Bank would have to follow.  They had 
to state the purpose for which they would use the loan.
42
  They had to 
provide evidence to demonstrate that their collateral was not only legally 
eligible but also acceptable from a credit standpoint.
43
  Further, they had to 
provide a statement of the efforts they had made to obtain adequate credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions, including their names and 
addresses, the dates on which they applied for credit, and the reasons, if 
any, given for refusal of credit.
44
  Reserve Banks were in turn obliged to 
ascertain that there was a reasonable need for such credit, and that the 
collateral was adequate to provide protection against losses.
45
 
1. Lending from 1932–1936 
Between 1932 and 1936, the Fed made loans to 123 entities.
46
  The 
largest of these loans was for $300,000.
47
  The aggregate amount of these 
loans was $1.5 million (about $23 million in today‘s dollars).
48
 
It can be seen that lending under § 13(3) was limited during this 
period.  There are three reasons why this was so.  First, as we saw above, 
the provision as enacted contained collateral constraints.
49
  Paper issued for 
the purpose of trading in investment securities was expressly ineligible for 
discount.
50
  Second, another legislative provision (§ 13(b)) was added to the 
FRA in 1934.
51
  This allowed Reserve Banks to make advances of working 
capital to established industrial and commercial firms that could not obtain 
credit from elsewhere.
52
  Third, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
formed in 1932, made loans to banks, insurance companies, and other 
 
 42. Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations, supra note 38, at 519. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 518. 
 46. HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 130.  See also Baxter, supra note 19, at 5 (stating that 
borrowers included a typewriter manufacturer, a vegetable grower, and a brewer); Gordon 
and Muller, supra note 20, at 30 (noting that borrowers were primarily ―industrial‖ firms 
rather than nonbank financial firms). 
 47. HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 130. 
 48. Baxter, supra note 19, at 13. 
 49. See infra Part III.A (explaining that before the FDICIA, § 13(3) loans to 
individuals, partnerships, and corporations were subject to the same collateral requirements 
as loans to member banks).  For this reason, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange ―issued or 
drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment 
securities,‖ other than U.S. government securities, were ineligible for discount.  Federal 
Reserve Act § 13(2), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). 
 50. Federal Reserve Act § 13(2). 
 51. Industrial Advances Act, 12 U.S.C. § 352a (1934). 
 52. But see the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 696 (2009) 
(repealing the Industrial Advances Act). 
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businesses on more attractive terms.
53
 
2. Lending from 1937–2008 
In later years, the Fed did occasionally activate its § 13(3) authority to 
lend.  However, it did not actually make any further loans until 2008.  For 
example, in 1966, for an eight-month period, the Fed authorized Reserve 
Banks to lend to mutual banks and savings and loans associations, which 
were then under liquidity pressures.
54
  In 1969, for a seven-month period, it 
authorized Reserve Banks to lend to banks facing competition for deposits 
from higher-yielding investments.
55
 
In 1970, the Penn Central Railroad suffered from financial difficulties.  
The Fed stated that it would provide assistance at the discount window to 
businesses that held its commercial paper.
56
  Overall, though, no liquidity 
crisis arose, and so the Fed made no loans.  In 1975, the Fed refused to 
provide credit to the City of New York, which was then undergoing 
financial difficulties.  Instead, it acted as fiscal agent for loans made by the 
Treasury to the City.
57
  It assumed a similar role when the corporations 
Lockheed and Chrysler sought credit in 1971 and 1979, respectively.
58
 
In 1980, the Fed activated its § 13(3) authority in contemplation of 
making a loan to a Michigan non-member bank.
59
  Finally, in 1991, the Fed 
refused to make a $25 billion loan to the Bank Insurance Fund of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, despite requests by the Treasury 
and the Chairman of the Corporation.
60
 
IV.  THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The Fed used § 13(3) a number of times during the financial crisis.  It 
provided assistance to individual firms.  It also established broader schemes 
to restore market stability.  In the analysis that follows, we will adopt a 
structural classification.  From the standpoint of statutory authority, it will 
be argued that the most problematic cases are those in which the Fed used § 
 
 53. David Fettig, Lender of More than Last Resort, THE REGION, Dec. 2002, at 44–45, 
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3392. 
 54. See Baxter, supra note 19, at 5. 
 55. Id. at 5–6. 
 56. Anna J. Schwartz, Senior Research Fellow, The Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
The Misuse of the Fed‘s Discount Window, Speech at the Sixth Annual Homer Jones 
Memorial Lecture at St. Louis University, 62–63 (Apr. 9, 1992), 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/09/Misuse_Sep_Oct1992.pdf). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Baxter, supra note 19, at 6. 
 60. Schwartz, supra note 56. 
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13(3) to purchase assets and those in which made loans against instruments 
other than credit instruments.  We will consider asset purchases first.  By 
way of comparison, we will next consider loan transactions, most of which 
fall more clearly within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority.  Finally, 
we will consider the highest profile case in which the Fed made no use of § 
13(3):  that of Lehman Brothers. 
A.  Asset purchases 
In a number of cases, the Fed used § 13(3) to buy assets from troubled 
financial institutions.  In form, these transactions were structured as loans.  
But in substance, they permitted the Fed to move assets off the balance 
sheets of these institutions and onto its own.
61
 
We saw above that when the Fed used § 13(3), the provision 
contemplated only secured loan transactions.  How, then, was the Fed able 
to effect these asset purchases?  The answer came in the form of a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV).  An SPV is an entity with distinct corporate 
personality from its parent.  It is formed to carry out a specific task – here, 
an asset purchase.
62
 
 
 61. See Baxter, supra note 19, at 13 (explaining that to achieve this result, the Fed 
created SPVs ―[w]hen we created Maiden Lane I to facilitate the JPMC-Bear merger, this 
lawyer was thinking the SPV would stand with its own balance sheet, independent of the 
Federal Reserve.  The accounting professionals taught me that, because of post-Enron 
reforms directed toward SPV accounting, the SPV needed to be reflected on the Federal 
Reserve‘s balance sheet.  And we have followed that professional advice.‖). 
 62. The composition of the Fed‘s balance sheet has been altered significantly by the 
actions that the Fed took during the crisis.  As of November 4, 2010, the Fed‘s total assets 
stood at $2.3 trillion.  Of these assets, 46% were mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and 
37% were Treasury securities.  Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Factors Affecting 
Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve 
Banks (November 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H41/20101104.  This can be contrasted with the 
position at the beginning of 2008.  At that time, the Fed had total assets of $926 billion.  Of 
these assets, 80% were Treasury securities.  The Fed held no mortgage-backed securities.  
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository 
Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks (January 3, 2008), available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H41/20080103. 
It should be emphasized that the vast majority of the Fed‘s mortgage-backed securities 
were purchased under its Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program.  This was 
established pursuant to Federal Reserve Act § 14(b), which, as we shall see below, permits 
the Fed to purchase and sell Treasury and agency securities.  Fed. Res. Bank of NY, 
Frequently Asked Questions: MBS Purchase Program (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mbs_faq_100217.html.  The Fed used this program to 
purchase MBS issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae.  Id.  It 
purchased $1.25 trillion of these securities between January 2009 and March 2010.  Id. 
The Fed‘s authority to purchase governmental securities under Federal Reserve Act § 
14(b) is beyond doubt.  However, as we shall see below, the Fed also purchased securities 
issued and backed only by private parties by using § 13(3).  See infra Part IV.A.1.ii.  It is 
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The Fed created SPVs in four cases.  First, it provided assistance to 
JPMorgan Chase (―JPMorgan‖) in its purchase of Bear Stearns.  Second, it 
purchased commercial paper from issuers under the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (CPFF).  Third, it purchased money market instruments 
from money market mutual funds (MMMFs) under the Money Market 
Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF).  Finally, it provided assistance to 
American International Group (AIG).  Once the Fed had created SPVs for 
these purposes, it lent money to them using § 13(3).  The SPVs in turn 
purchased assets from the troubled institutions.  These assets served as 
collateral for the Fed‘s loans to the SPVs. 
There are three reasons why this transactional structure exceeded the 
scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority.  The first is the loan/asset-purchase 
distinction.  The second is the requirement of a loan to the party that needs 
assistance.  And the third is the discount/advance distinction.  We will 
develop these points with reference to the case of Bear Stearns and 
JPMorgan.  We will then apply them to subsequent transactions that used 
the same structure. 
There is one additional concern: whether the loans were in fact 
secured to the satisfaction of the Fed at the time it made them.  However, 
this point lies beyond the scope of this analysis.  This is so primarily 
because of the difficulties of valuing collateral.  Hence we shall assume 
below, unless there is a clear indication otherwise, that loans that were 
secured were backed by sufficient collateral. 
1.  Bear Stearns and JPMorgan 
i.  Background 
Bear Stearns was an investment bank.  Because it lacked deposits, it 
was dependent on the securities repurchase market for its credit.  Many of 
its investments were in mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
63
  In March 
2008, Bear Stearns started to experience severe difficulties in obtaining 
credit.  Its lenders declined to extend the terms of their existing loans, or 
refused to make new loans.
64
  Between March 10 and March 13, 2008, its 
cash reserves fell from $18 billion to $2 billion.
65
 
 
this exercise of legal authority that raises the most important concerns. 
 63. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REP. PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: BRIDGE LOAN 
TO THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC. THROUGH JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 1, 
available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bearstearnsbridgeloan.pdf. 
 64. Id. at 2-3. 
 65. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE‘S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 
153–54 (Crown Publishing Group 2009). 
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The Fed made an overnight loan to Bear Stearns on March 14, 2008.
66
  
The purpose of this loan was to enable Bear Stearns to meet its immediate 
obligations in the securities repurchase market and to prevent its 
bankruptcy so that it could explore alternatives. 
However, even after this emergency loan, Bear Stearns‘s cash reserves 
and stock price continued to decrease.
67
  JPMorgan emerged as a potential 
purchaser of the company.  However, it did not wish to acquire all of Bear 
Stearns‘s assets.  In particular, it sought to avoid purchasing Bear Stearns‘s 
illiquid MBS.  So on March 16, 2008, two days after its first loan to Bear 
Stearns, the Fed agreed to acquire these assets.
68
 
To achieve this goal, the Fed created an SPV.  This was a limited 
liability company called Maiden Lane.  The Fed authorized the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (the ―New York FRB‖) to lend up to $30 
billion to Maiden Lane.
69
  Maiden Lane would use this money to purchase 
Bear Stearns‘s illiquid assets, which would serve as collateral for the New 
 
 66. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REPORT 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: 
BRIDGE LOAN TO THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC. THROUGH JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, 
N.A. 1, available at  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bearstearnsbridgeloan.pdf. 
  The transaction took place in two stages.  First, the New York Federal Reserve Bank 
lent $12.9 billion to JPMorgan at the discount window.  Id. at 3.  This loan was made 
without recourse.  Second, JPMorgan lent the same amount to Bear Stearns.  In each case, 
$13.8 billion of Bear Stearns‘ assets provided collateral for the loan.   Id.  JPMorgan‘s loan 
to Bear Stearns was secured by these assets, and so was the New York FRB‘s loan to 
JPMorgan. 
To make this loan, the Fed invoked Federal Reserve Act § 11(r).  It did so because 
one of the Governors, Frederic Mishkin, was abroad and could not be contacted, leaving 
only four others to approve the decision.  The Fed. Res., Minutes of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 3 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/other20080627a1.pdf.  As required 
by this provision, the Fed found that the loan to Bear Stearns was necessary to prevent 
serious harm to financial stability.  S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 
supra at 3.  In support of its findings, the Fed cited the fragile condition of the financial 
markets, the prominent position of Bear Stearns in those markets, and the expected 
―contagion‖ that would result from its failure.  Id. at 2.  In a later report, the Fed expanded 
on its reasoning.  Bear Stearns was a ―major borrower and lender in the repurchase 
agreement market.‖  Id.  Its failure would have resulted in a significant drop in the 
availability of short-term financing, and possibly in threats to the solvency of other large 
and highly leveraged financial institutions.  Id. at 3. 
 67. WESSEL, supra note 65, at 166. 
 68. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON 
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 5 (2009). 
 69. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., MAIDEN LANE LLC: A SPECIAL-PURPOSE VEHICLE 
CONSOLIDATED BY THE FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/annual/annual08/MaidenLanefinstmt2009.pdf. 
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York FRB‘s loan.
70
 
In turn, JPMorgan agreed to lend $1 billion to Maiden Lane.
71
  Its loan 
was made subordinate to the New York FRB‘s loan.
72
  In this way, 
JPMorgan would bear the first $1 billion of any losses among the illiquid 
assets that Maiden Lane had purchased.  The Fed would bear any 
remaining losses.  JPMorgan also agreed to guarantee Bear Stearns‘s 
ongoing trading obligations between signing and closing.
73
 
ii.  Assessment 
We will now set out in greater detail the three reasons why this 
transactional structure exceeded the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority.  
The first point concerns the loan/asset-purchase distinction.  We argued 
above that at the time the Fed used § 13(3), the language of the statute 
contemplated a loan transaction, not an asset purchase.  This transaction 
was a loan, but only in form.  The Fed extended credit to Maiden Lane so 
that Maiden Lane could purchase Bear Stearns‘s illiquid assets.  The 
primary goal of the transaction was to remove these assets from Bear 
Stearns‘s balance sheet, and so facilitate its acquisition by JPMorgan. 
By way of comparison, Reserve Banks do have the authority to 
purchase and sell certain assets in their open-market operations.  FRA § 14 
expressly grants this power to Reserve Banks.  However, the power is 
limited in scope.  Reserve Banks can purchase and sell only a defined list 
of assets, including Treasury and agency securities.  Securities issued and 
backed by corporations do not appear on this list.
74
  Hence the Fed used § 
 
 70. Id.  According to Maiden Lane‘s financial statements for the year ending 2008, the 
Bear Stearns assets consisted largely of mortgage-related securities, whole mortgages loans, 
a total return swap with JPMorgan, and certain mortgage commitments.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 12. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns Announce Amended Agreement 
(Mar. 24, 2008), 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM_redesign/JPM_Content_C/Generic_Detai
l_Page_Template&cid=1159339104093&c=JPM_Content_C (setting out the key terms of 
the amended merger agreement).  JPMorgan agreed to pay a higher price per share:  $10 
rather than $2.  Id.  When the loan closed on June 26, 2008, there had been adjustments in 
the values of the assets that Maiden Lane had purchased from Bear Stearns.  Overall, the 
New York FRB lent Maiden Lane $28.8 billion, and JPMorgan lent Maiden Lane $1.1 
billion.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON 
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 9 (2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate02252009.pdf. 
 74. Federal Reserve Act § 14, 12 U.S.C. §§ 353-359 (2006).  In full, the assets eligible 
for purchase by the Fed under Federal Reserve Act § 14 are:  gold (§ 14(a)), debt issued or 
guaranteed by the US government or its agencies (§ 14(b)(1)), debt issued by state, local and 
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13(3), a provision that then made no reference to the Fed‘s ability to buy 
and sell, to effect the purchase of privately issued securities in a transaction 
that would have been impermissible under § 14 itself.  It is difficult to see 
how the Fed‘s loan-making power under § 13(3) could have encompassed 
such a purchase.
75
 
The second point concerns the requirement of a loan to the party that 
needs assistance.  We argued above that § 13(3) required that the borrower 
be the same party that had difficulty obtaining credit from elsewhere:  the 
 
foreign governments (§ 14(b)(1)), and three kinds of private debt.  Id.  The first two are 
cable transfers (foreign exchange) and bankers‘ acceptances (orders to pay that become 
promises to pay after a banker accepts them).  Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 26-28. 
The Fed may also purchase bills of exchange.  From member banks, it may purchase 
bills of exchange ―arising out of commercial transactions.‖  Federal Reserve Act § 14(c).  
And in the open market, it may purchase bills of exchange ―of the kinds and maturities . . . 
made eligible for rediscount‖ by the Federal Reserve Act.  Id. at § 14.  A bill of exchange is 
a three-party instrument in which A orders that B make a payment to C.  See supra Part II.B. 
In ordinary circumstances, then, the Fed may purchase bills of exchange as set out in 
Federal Reserve Act § 13(4) (demand bills of exchange relating to the domestic shipment of 
agricultural goods), § 13(6) (acceptances relating to the shipment of goods and acceptances 
to create dollar exchanges), and § 13(2) (bills of exchange secured by agricultural paper).  
The Fed may also purchase bills of exchange eligible for discount under § 13(2) (those 
issued or drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes – or that have proceeds 
that will be used for such purposes – with a maximum maturity period of ninety days).  See 
supra note 10 (setting out instruments eligible for discount at the discount window); Small 
& Clouse, supra note 7, at 34 (setting out assets eligible for purchase in the open-market).  It 
is possible to argue that § 13(3) expands the range of bills of exchange that the Fed can 
purchase under § 14.  This is because § 13(3) is a provision under which these instruments 
are ―made eligible for rediscount,‖ as required by § 14.  In this way, Small and Clouse 
suggest that in ―unusual and exigent circumstances,‖ the Fed may be able to purchase bills 
of exchange that are endorsed or secured as required by § 13(3).  Id. at 30-31.  However, 
they note that the point remains unsettled.  Id. 
We can make two further points in connection with this analysis.  The first is that the 
Fed did not invoke § 14 when it set up any of its SPV transactions.  It made reference to § 
13(3) alone.  As such, it did not resolve the question whether § 13(3) extends the range of 
bills of exchange that are eligible for purchase under § 14.  The second point is that 
corporate securities are not bills of exchange.  And commercial paper is not a banker‘s 
acceptance.  Hence the Fed‘s purchases of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized 
debt obligations from Bear Stearns and AIG would not have come within the scope of § 14.  
See infra Part IV.A.4.  Neither, in turn, would its purchases of commercial paper and 
money-market instruments under the CPFF and the MMIFF.  See infra Parts IV.A.2-3. 
 75. There is a possible counter-argument.  I am grateful to Professor Howell Jackson 
for raising it with me.  The argument is that a non-recourse loan on which the borrower 
defaults has the same effect as an asset-purchase.  To illustrate this, let us suppose that 
instead of using the SPV structure, the Fed had made a large non-recourse loan to JPMorgan 
to facilitate its acquisition of Bear Stearns.  If JPMorgan decided to default on the loan, the 
Fed would be left with an interest in the collateral, which it would then sell in an attempt to 
recoup its losses.  The outcome in this scenario is the same as that in the purchase 
transaction.  However, as we pointed out supra note 12, these transactions are analytically 
distinct.  Once more, in a loan transaction, the bank‘s goal at the outset is to lend money 
against the borrower‘s collateral, not to acquire it. 
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loan had to be made to such individual, partnership, or corporation.
76
 
On the present facts, Maiden Lane was the borrower.  Bear Stearns, on 
the other hand, was the party unable to secure credit from elsewhere.  We 
can say that Bear Stearns was the beneficiary of the New York FRB‘s loan 
transaction, because it was able to sell various illiquid assets.
77
  Even so, 
one party received a loan, and a different party had difficulty obtaining 
credit.
78
 
A response to this argument would be to say that our focus on the 
word ―such‖ may be textually correct, but that it may result in 
inefficiencies.  It requires that the Fed make loans only directly to the party 
that requires them.  A court interpreting the statute might instead have 
concluded that there were strong arguments in favor of the Fed‘s being able 
to make loans indirectly through another entity.  For example, the Fed may 
have wished, for reasons of transactional efficiency, to create one company 
through which it could make loans to a series of other companies.  For this 
reason, a court might have read the language of the statute broadly, so that 
such individual referred not only to the immediate borrower but also to the 
beneficiary:  the ultimate borrower. 
Even so, on the present facts, it is difficult to see where the Fed 
achieved any increase in transactional efficiency.  It made a loan to only 
one beneficiary.  The more persuasive view must instead be that the Fed 
incorporated the SPV so that it could fit its transaction within the loan form 
and so effect the asset purchase that we criticized above. 
 
 76. See supra Part II.D. 
 77. Or perhaps this was JPMorgan, because it was able to buy Bear Stearns.  
Regardless, the analysis stands unchanged. 
 78. The Fed‘s minutes of March 16, 2008 do make reference to the statutory 
requirement of a loan to the party that needs assistance.  See The Fed. Res., Minutes of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2 (Mar. 16, 2008), available at 
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/other20080627a2.pdf (stating that the Fed 
authorized the New York FRB to ―make a nonrecourse loan of up to $30 billion . . . if [the 
New York FRB] found that adequate credit accommodations were not available to the 
borrower from other banking sources‖) (emphasis added).  However, the Fed did not go on 
to consider the question whether it was indeed lending to a borrower that found itself in this 
position. 
There remains a counter-argument:  that Maiden Lane was itself unable to secure 
adequate credit from other banking institutions.  The steps in this argument are as follows.  
At the moment of its incorporation, Maiden Lane had no assets.  It had one sole purpose:  to 
purchase certain assets from Bear Stearns.  It is difficult to see why anyone other than its 
parent would lend to such a company.  Any other lender might refuse to make a loan 
because it would be plain to that lender that the Fed would shortly make a loan to its own 
SPV.  This argument seems strained.  However, if it is correct, then the Fed will be able to 
avoid the requirement of a borrower‘s being unable to secure credit every time it places an 
SPV between itself and the beneficiary of the transaction.  And so it seems likely that the 
courts would reject this analysis because, ex hypothesi, it negates one of the conditions of 
the statute. 
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The third point concerns the discount/advance distinction.  It can be 
argued that in this transaction, there was no discount within the meaning of 
§ 13(3).  We saw above that discounting involves lending against a 
financial instrument at a discount from the face value of that instrument.  It 
follows that the borrower must have existing assets to begin with, before it 
receives any loan.  However, in the present transaction, Maiden Lane did 
not have any assets at the time of its incorporation.  Instead, it used the 
Fed‘s loan to purchase Bear Stearns‘ securities.  Only after this purchase 
was it able to provide any collateral for the Fed‘s transaction.  A loan 
secured by the borrower‘s own pledge of future payment is an advance, not 
a discount.
79
 
However, this concern could perhaps have been resolved.  If Bear 
Stearns‘s assets had been transferred to Maiden Lane first, before the Fed 
extended credit against them, then the statutory requirement of a discount 
may have been met. 
2.  The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) 
We will now go on to apply these and other arguments to another case 
in which the Fed effected an asset purchase:  that of the CPFF.  An 
additional point to reemphasize at this stage is that, as we have seen, § 
13(3) requires financial instruments against which loans are to be made to 
be endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank.  
This is the requirement of endorsement or security. 
 
 79. When a Reserve Bank makes an advance at its discount window, it extends credit in 
exchange for the borrower‘s own promissory note.  Ordinarily, the borrower must also 
provide some security for its promise to pay.  See Federal Reserve Act § 13(8), 12 U.S.C. § 
347 (2006) (stating that Reserve Banks can make ninety-day advances to individual member 
banks on notes that are secured by such financial instruments as are eligible for discount or 
purchase under the other provisions of the FRA); § 10B (stating that Reserve Banks can 
make advances to individual member banks on their time or demand notes where such notes 
are secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank); § 10A (stating that Reserve Banks can 
make advances to groups of member banks on their unsecured demand notes, provided they 
have no assets available for discounting); § 13(13) (stating Reserve Banks can make 
advances to any individual, partnership, or corporation on notes that are secured by Treasury 
or agency securities).  See also supra note 10 and accompanying notes; Regulation A, 12 
C.F.R. § 201.4(d) (2001) (explaining that, in accordance with § 13(13) FRA, Reserve Banks 
can make advances to nonbanks only against Treasury or agency securities). 
Advances are made more often than discounts.  See Gordon & Muller, supra note 20, 
at 29 n.100 (―In general loans made to depository banks through the discount window have 
been in the form of ‗advances,‘ evidenced by a promissory note from the borrower, on the 
security of the borrower, rather than a ‗discount‘ on third-party indebtedness pledged by the 
borrower.  This is because the loan transaction is straight-forward and the collateral 
requirements are looser.‖). 
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i.  Background 
Commercial paper is short-term, high-quality debt issued by 
corporations.  In the days following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
(which will be considered below),
80
 the market for new issuances of 
commercial paper began to decline. 
Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) and other investors became 
reluctant to invest in commercial paper.
81
  Those that continued to invest 
did so at high interest rates and on a short-term basis, such as overnight.
82
  
As a result, many corporations had to make payments on their maturing 
commercial paper by issuing new paper (thereby ―rolling over‖ their 
paper).  To meet the credit needs of these corporations in the longer term, 
the Fed created the CPFF on October 7, 2008.
83
 
The CPFF, which expired on February 1, 2010, purchased newly 
issued commercial paper from corporate issuers.
84
  It purchased both asset-
backed and unsecured commercial paper.
85
  To create this program, the Fed 
incorporated an SPV: the Commercial Paper Funding Facility LLC.  It 
made a series of loans to the SPV, via the New York FRB.
86
 
Certain fees were also applicable.  Each issuer had to pay a fee in 
order to use the CPFF.
87
  Furthermore, issuers of unsecured paper had to 
pay a ―credit enhancement fee‖ of 100 basis points before the SPV would 
purchase their paper.
88
  These fees were intended to provide the SPV with 
some protection against losses. 
 
 80. See infra Part IV.C. 
 81. Press Release, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Board Announces Creation 
of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to Help Provide Liquidity to Term 
Funding Markets (Oct. 7, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Commercial Paper Funding Facility: Frequently Asked 
Questions (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/cpff_faq.html [hereinafter 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility]. 
 84. Id.  In fact, primary dealers acted as intermediaries between the Fed‘s SPV and the 
issuers.  Id. 
 85. Asset-backed commercial paper is commercial paper secured by an underlying 
asset.  Unsecured commercial paper, on the other hand, is backed by the issuer‘s bare 
promise to pay. 
 86. Commercial Paper Funding Facility, supra note 83. 
 87. Id. 
 88. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., COMMERCIAL PAPER FUNDING FACILITY LLC, A SPECIAL-
PURPOSE VEHICLE CONSOLIDATED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 14, 2008 TO DECEMBER 31, 2008, AND 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS‘ REPORT 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/annual/annual08/CPFFfinstmt2009.pdf. 
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ii.  Assessment 
Once more, it will be argued that this transactional structure went 
beyond the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority.  It is closely analogous to 
the structure used in the Bear Stearns-JPMorgan transaction.  The Fed 
created an SPV, then extended loans to it that were to be used for the 
purchase of certain assets.  However, an important difference in this case is 
that the assets to be purchased were unsecured as well as asset-backed. 
Two of the arguments made above are once more applicable in the 
present case.  First, there remains a concern about the loan/asset-purchase 
distinction.  Again, this SPV effected asset purchases rather than loans.  
Second, there is also a concern about the requirement of a loan to the party 
that needs assistance.  Here, the borrower (the SPV) was not the same 
party as that which had difficulty obtaining credit from elsewhere (the 
issuer of commercial paper). 
The discount/advance distinction does not seem to be a concern here 
because, as we have seen, issuers had to pay fees in order to use the CPFF.  
Hence the SPV did have some existing assets with which to collateralize its 
loans from the Fed.  However, there is a further concern in the context of 
this transaction:  that the requirement of endorsement or security was not 
met.  By purchasing unsecured commercial paper under the CPFF, the Fed 
went against the statutory requirement that financial instruments being 
discounted must be endorsed or secured. 
It may be argued in response that the Fed enjoys some measure of 
discretion in this area:  a loan need only be secured to the satisfaction of the 
Reserve Bank.  However, as concluded above, the most persuasive reading 
of the statute looks at the need for some security.
89
  An issuer‘s promise to 
pay provides no such security. 
There is a counter-argument:  that the Fed secured its loans by 
imposing fees on issuers who sold their commercial paper to the CPFF.  
We saw above that issuers of unsecured commercial paper had to pay a 
surcharge of 100 basis points before their paper would be eligible for 
purchase.  Even if we include the registration fees collected from all 
participants, the total amount of collateral was fractional at best.  
Nevertheless, it remains possible to argue that by collecting these fees, the 
Fed secured its loans to its own satisfaction.  
3.  The Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) 
i.  Background 
Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) are financial institutions that 
 
 89. See supra Part II.F. 
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invest in high-quality debt instruments, such as Treasury bills and 
commercial paper.
90
  They issue shares to their investors that can be 
redeemed for cash.  Because they invest in low-risk instruments, they are 
ordinarily able to maintain a stable net asset value of $1 per share. 
The Reserve Primary Fund is one such fund.  It had invested $785 
million (1.2% of its total assets) in Lehman‘s commercial paper.  Once 
Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the fund was unable to meet the cumulative 
requests for redemptions.  It therefore suspended these requests, and it also 
began to sell off its asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP).  On 
September 16, 2008, it cut the price of its shares to 97 cents per share, 
thereby ‗breaking the buck‘ and setting in motion a run on money markets. 
In response, on September 19, 2008, the Fed created the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) (which 
we shall examine below when we come to consider loan transactions).
91
  
This facility made loans to depository institutions that would purchase 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market mutual funds 
(MMMFs). 
However, the AMLF was not the Fed‘s only response to the 
difficulties faced by MMMFs.  Later, on October 21, 2008, it also created 
the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF).  This facility was 
intended to purchase money-market instruments from MMMFs, including 
commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and bank notes.  However, no 
purchases were ever made under the program, which expired on February 
1, 2010.
92
 
To create it, the Fed incorporated a series of SPVs.  It planned to make 
loans to them via the New York FRB.  The SPVs would purchase money 
market instruments for 90% of their value in cash.
93
  To cover the 
remaining 10%, they would issue subordinated ABCP to the MMMFs.  In 
this way, the MMMFs would absorb the first 10% of losses. 
ii.  Assessment 
For reasons similar to those given above, it will be argued that this 
 
 90. Money market mutual funds emerged in the 1970s in response to Regulation Q, 
which permitted the Fed to limit interest rates on demand deposits.  Because money market 
mutual funds issue demand equity, they came outside the scope of this Regulation.  It was 
phased out in 1982.  CARNELL, ET AL., supra note 7, at 23-25. 
 91. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 92. BAIRD WEBEL & MARC LABONTE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL TURMOIL REPORT 22 (Feb. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41073.pdf. 
 93. THE FED. RES., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: MONEY MARKET INVESTOR FUNDING FACILITY 2 (2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129mmiff.pdf. 
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transactional structure went beyond the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) 
authority.  First, the transaction did not observe the loan/asset-purchase 
distinction.  Second, there was no loan to the party that needs assistance.  
Third, it seems that the requirement of endorsement or security was not 
met.  This is so if we assume that the facility purchased unsecured as well 
as secured commercial paper.  Its terms do not address this point.
94
 
Finally, it is also possible that the discount/advance distinction would 
not have been met.  There is no indication that MMMFs had to pay fees to 
use this program.  If they did not, then the SPVs would not, before making 
purchases, have had any assets with which to collateralize their loans from 
the Fed. 
4.  AIG 
Above, we considered transactions that effected asset purchases.  The 
case of AIG is a hybrid case insofar as it involved both asset purchases and 
loans.  We will argue that only the loan elements of this transaction came 
within the scope of the Fed‘s statutory authority. 
i.  Background 
AIG is a large holding company.  Its primary business is the provision 
of insurance.
95
  It does this through a number of state-regulated 
subsidiaries.
96
  It also has a financial services business.
97
  This subsidiary, 
AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), was counterparty to a number of credit 
default swaps (CDS) (contracts that transfer the risk of default from a party 
purchasing protection to a party providing it).
98
  By writing such swaps, 
AIGFP provided protection to a number of entities, such as financial 
institutions, pension funds, and municipalities.
99
 
AIG had been operating a securities lending program under which it 
lent out securities held by its life insurance subsidiaries in exchange for 
 
 94. The terms of the facility do not indicate whether it was restricted to secured paper.  
Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Money Market Investor Funding Facility: Program Terms and 
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mmiff_terms.html.  
However, Scott suggests that unsecured paper was eligible for purchase.  See HAL S. SCOTT, 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Foundation Press 2009) at 28 (―[T]he actual assets of the 
SPV [were] generally uncollateralized.‖). 
 95. U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, STATUS OF 
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG 4 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09975.pdf. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. SCOTT, supra note 94, at 42-45.  By the end of 2008, the size of AIG‘s CDS 
portfolio was $527 billion.  Id. at 43. 
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cash.
100
  AIG used these funds to purchase other securities, such as MBS.
101
  
When the value of these securities declined, AIG was obliged to post 
additional collateral for its counterparties.
102
  Furthermore, when credit 
rating agencies downgraded their ratings on AIG in May 2008, it was again 
obliged to post additional collateral under the terms of its CDS 
agreements.
103
  AIG suffered a further rating downgrade in September 
2008.
104
  By this stage, a number of counterparties refused to transact with 
it, and it faced severe liquidity problems.
105
 
The Fed was concerned that AIG might default on its CDS.  In the 
Fed‘s view, this would have led to a ―steep decline in confidence in the 
global banking system and possibly to the collapse of other major financial 
institutions.‖
106
 
a.  Initial structure 
On September 16, 2008, the Fed authorized the New York FRB to 
lend up to $85 billion to AIG under § 13(3).
107
  This lending took place 
under a two-year revolving credit facility.
108
  The loan was secured by 
pledges of many of the assets of AIG and its subsidiaries (other than its 
state- and foreign-regulated subsidiaries).
109
  As additional compensation to 
the government, AIG issued preferred stock in trust for the Treasury.
110
  
 
 100. U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 95, at 8. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 11. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 12. 
 105. Id.  AIG had posted $19.7 billion of collateral by the end of August 2008.  Id. 
 106. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON 
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 11 (2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate02252009.pdf. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See THE FED. RES., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY 
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: SECURITIES BORROWING FACILITY FOR AMERICAN 
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 3  (2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129aigsecborrowfacility.pdf (―The 
Securities Borrowing Facility has the same maximum duration as the September Facility 
(September 16, 2010) in order to allow the company to conduct an orderly disposition of 
certain of its assets‖). 
 109. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: SECURITIES 
BORROWING FACILITY FOR AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 5-6  (2008), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/FederalReserveReportonSecuredCreditFacilityAIG.p
df. 
 110. Id. at 7. 
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This stock was convertible into 79.9% of AIG‘s common stock.
111
 
Next, on October 8, 2008, the Fed provided further funds to AIG 
under § 13(3).  It authorized the New York FRB to borrow $37.8 billion of 
investment-grade securities from AIG under AIG‘s securities lending 
program in exchange for cash collateral.
112
 
b.  Revised structure 
On November 10, 2008, the Treasury and the Fed together 
restructured the Fed‘s investment following the creation of the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP).
113
  The Treasury purchased $40 billion of 
preferred stock in AIG.  AIG used these proceeds in part to repay $25 
billion of the Fed‘s loans.
114
  In this way, the size of the Fed‘s credit facility 
was reduced from $85 billion to $60 billion.
115
  Next, the Fed created two 
further credit facilities for AIG.  These were two new SPVs:  Maiden Lane 
II and Maiden Lane III LLC. 
Maiden Lane II received a $19.5 billion loan from the New York 
FRB.  It used this loan to purchase AIG‘s residential MBS portfolio.
116
  
AIG used these funds and others of its own to pay back the Fed‘s $37.8 
billion loan of October 8, 2008.
117
  It then terminated its securities lending 
program. 
Maiden Lane III received a $24.3 billion loan from the New York 
FRB.
118
  It used this loan to purchase from AIG‘s counterparties those 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Board Authorizes 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to Borrow Securities from certain regulated U.S. 
insurance subsidiaries of AIG (Oct. 8, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20081008a.htm (describing the 
transaction).  In effect, though, AIG itself borrowed cash from the Fed and provided 
securities as collateral. 
 113. TARP was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 (―EESA‖).  
It made available up to $700 billion of funds. 12 U.S.C. § 5225 (2008).  Initially, it was 
envisaged that these would be used to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions.  
However, the Treasury later decided to make capital investments instead.  Press Release, 
U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description 
(Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm. 
 114. SCOTT, supra note 94, at 44. 
 115. The interest rate on this facility was also reduced, from 850 basis points above 
three-month LIBOR to 300 basis points above three-month LIBOR.  Id. at 44. 
 116. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Maiden Lane Transactions, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane2.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter Maiden Lane Transactions]. 
 117. SCOTT, supra note 94, at 44.  Hence, as Scott points out, ―this represented a 
restructuring of existing debt rather than an injection of additional funds.‖  Id. 
 118. Maiden Lane Transactions, supra note 116. 
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collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
119
 on which AIG had written 
CDS.
120
  As part of these transactions, each counterparty agreed to 
terminate its CDS contracts with AIG.
121
 
c.  Re-revised structure 
On March 2, 2009, the Treasury and the Fed restructured their 
investments once more.  The Treasury created a new five-year equity 
capital facility, under which AIG could obtain $30 billion of capital in 
exchange for newly issued preferred stock.
122
 
The Fed restructured its revolving credit facility.  It reduced the size of 
this facility from $60 billion to $25 billion.
123
  In exchange, the Fed 
received stock interests in certain of AIG‘s subsidiaries.
124
  Furthermore, 
the Fed authorized the New York FRB under § 13(3) to lend $8.5 billion to 
AIG‘s life insurance subsidiaries.
125
 
ii.  Assessment 
The above series of transactions can be classified into loan 
arrangements and asset purchases.  The Fed made certain loans to AIG 
under § 13(3).  Later, these loans were restructured, such that the Treasury 
assumed greater risk.  These actions appear to have come within the scope 
of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority.  The loans were secured by the assets of 
 
 119. CDOs are asset-backed or synthetic securities.  These represent interests in a set of 
underlying assets or referenced obligations.  HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: 
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 566–567 (Foundation Press) (2009) [hereinafter 
SCOTT II]. 
 120. Maiden Lane Transactions, supra note 116. 
 121. Id. 
 122. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON 
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate02252009.pdf.  The 
Treasury also exchanged its preferred stock for shares with terms that more closely resemble 
common equity.  Id. 
 123. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: RESTRUCTURING 
OF THE GOVERNMENT‘S FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 
6 (2009), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/AIGMarch2009RestructuringReportFinal.pdf. 
 124. Id. at 9. 
 125. Id. at 5  (describing the Fed‘s decision to extend credit to AIG and outlining the 
terms of the agreement).  In more precise terms, the Fed authorized the New York FRB to 
make loans to certain SPVs to be established by these subsidiaries.  Id.  The SPVs would 
repay these loans from the net cash flows they received from blocks of life insurance 
policies held by the parent insurance companies.  Id. 
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AIG and its subsidiaries. 
In contrast, it appears that the set of transactions effected by Maiden 
Lane II and III went beyond the scope of the Fed‘s authority.  The primary 
concerns once more are the loan/asset-purchase distinction and the 
requirement of a loan to the party that needs assistance. 
B.  Loan transactions 
The transactions in this group resemble more closely the paradigmatic 
loans that are contemplated by § 13(3).  For the most part, then, it will be 
argued that these transactions fell within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) 
authority. 
However, the remaining concerns are two-fold.  The first is whether 
the requirement of a loan to the party that needs assistance was met.  The 
second is whether the Fed did in fact lend against appropriate collateral.  
But as we stated above, an examination of the quality of collateral lies 
beyond the scope of this analysis.  We shall assume once more, unless there 
is a clear indication otherwise, that those loans that were secured were 
backed by sufficient collateral. 
We shall consider four lending facilities.
126
  The first is the Term 
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), under which the Fed lent out Treasury 
securities to primary dealers.  The second is the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (PDCF), under which the Fed provided overnight loans to primary 
dealers.  The third is the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), under which the Fed made loans 
 
 126. The Fed also invoked § 13(3) when entering into certain arrangements with 
Citigroup and Bank of America pursuant to the Treasury‘s Asset Guarantee Program.  BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE RESIDUAL 
FINANCING TO CITIGROUP, INC.  FOR A DESIGNATED ASSET POOL (2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129citigroup.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE RESIDUAL FINANCING TO BANK OF 
AMERICA CORPORATION RELATING TO A DESIGNATED ASSET POOL (2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bofa.pdf.  Under this program, the 
Treasury and the FDIC agreed to bear a portion of any losses in designated pools of assets 
held by these two financial institutions.  On November 23, 2008 and January 15, 2009, the 
Fed authorized its Reserve Banks to make § 13(3) loans to Citigroup and Bank of America, 
respectively, in the event that they incurred losses in amounts greater than those agreed to be 
borne by the Treasury and the FDIC.  Id.  The Fed made no loans under these programs, 
which have since been terminated.  Id.; Road to Stability, Asset Guarantee Program, 
FINANCIALSTABILITY.GOV, 
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/assetguaranteeprogram.htm (last updated 
Oct. 3, 2010).  Had any loans been made, it seems the only § 13(3) concerns raised thereby 
would have been as to the kinds of instruments eligible for discount, because corporate 
shares were not expressly excluded from the scope of the arrangements.  See supra Part II.B. 
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to banks and other financial institutions that purchased commercial paper.  
Finally, we shall consider the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF), under which the Fed made loans to investors that were used to 
purchase asset-backed securities. 
1.  The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) 
i.  Background 
Primary dealers are large financial institutions that trade directly with 
the Fed.
127
  They purchase and sell Treasury and other securities on its 
behalf, and so help it conduct its open-market operations.
128
  Unlike 
commercial banks, primary dealers (and securities dealers more generally) 
do not have a base of deposits with which to finance their operations.
129
  
Instead, they borrow funds in the credit markets.  Much of their borrowing 
takes place in the securities repurchase market.
130
 
In this market, primary dealers enter into repurchase agreements, the 
effect of which is to allow them to borrow funds against their own 
securities.  These transactions are structured as purchases.  A dealer sells a 
security to a lender, and agrees to repurchase it at a fixed price on a 
specified date.
131
  The lender has possession of the security until the dealer 
repurchases it.  The lender is entitled to sell it in the event that the dealer 
defaults.  It has further protection in the form of the haircut that it applies to 
the value of the collateral. 
Repurchase agreements help to ensure the efficient allocation of 
capital in financial markets.  For dealers, they are a source of funds for 
transactional activities.  For lenders, they are a relatively safe way of 
lending out surplus funds for a short term:  typically overnight, but perhaps 
for up to two weeks. 
By March 2008, lenders had become reluctant to enter into these 
agreements.  They were concerned about the solvency of borrowers, as well 
 
 127. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealers (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed02.html. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15 
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECO. AND FIN. 1, 5 (Aug. 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473444 (explaining that ―[w]hile 
traditional commercial banks hold nontradable bank loans on the asset side of their balance 
sheets and nontradable deposits on the liability side, dealers hold tradable securities on the 
asset side.‖). 
 130. At the end of 2007, repurchase transactions made up 38% of broker-dealers‘ total 
liabilities.  Id. at 2. 
 131. Most repurchase agreements (including the Fed‘s) are actually structured as triparty 
agreements.  The third party is a clearing bank, at which the borrower posts collateral and 
receives funds.  Id. 
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as the value of the securities pledged as collateral.
132
  MBS were perceived 
as particularly risky.
133
  A number of lenders chose to lend only against the 
safest securities, such as Treasury securities.
134
  Those lenders that 
continued to lend against riskier securities applied sharp haircuts.
135
 
In response, on March 11, 2008, the Fed created the TSLF.  This 
facility, which expired on February 1, 2010,
136
 lent out Treasury securities 
to primary dealers, who provided their own securities (including MBS) as 
collateral.
137
  The New York FRB was authorized to lend out a total of $200 
billion of Treasury securities.
138
  These loans were allocated by weekly 
auction.
139
 
The program was not designed to be a long-term response to liquidity 
problems in the credit markets.  Each loan had a maturity of twenty-eight 
days.
140
  Furthermore, loans were made with recourse, so that dealers were 
obliged to repay the Fed for any decline in the value of the collateral that 
they had pledged.
141
 
ii.  Assessment 
The TSLF appears to have come within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) 
authority.  This facility made a series of loans to primary dealers that were 
collateralized by their debt securities.
142
  This transactional structure seems 
to fulfill the requirements set out in § 13(3).
143
 
2.  The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) 
i.  Background 
Even after the Fed had averted the collapse of Bear Stearns, other 
primary dealers still faced their own difficulties obtaining credit in the 
repurchase markets.  And so on March 16, 2008 (the same day on which 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Term Securities Lending Facility: Program Terms and 
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/tslf_terms.html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., FOMC Statement: Federal 
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Specific Measures Designed to Address 
Liquidity Pressures in Funding Markets (Mar. 11, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080311a.htm. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. WESSEL, supra note 65, at 152. 
 142. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 136. 
 143. See supra Part II.B. 
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the Fed provided funds for the Bear Stearns acquisition), the Fed opened a 
new lending facility for primary dealers:  the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
(PDCF). 
The PDCF, which expired on February 1, 2010,
144
 provided secured 
overnight loans to primary dealers.
145
  It was analogous to the existing 
discount window program for banks.  However, there were two important 
differences.  First, discount window loans had a longer maturity period, of 
up to ninety days.  Second, a broader range of collateral was eligible to be 
pledged at the PDCF than at the discount window:  all collateral eligible for 
pledge in triparty repurchase agreements with the Fed.
146
  A haircut was 
applied to this collateral. 
ii.  Assessment 
Initially, it appears that the PDCF came within the scope of the Fed‘s 
§ 13(3) authority.  As at the TSLF, the Fed made a series of secured loans 
to primary dealers (but of cash rather than of Treasury securities).  
However, the PDCF did not restrict instruments eligible for discount to 
credit instruments.
147
  And as we saw above, corporate shares do not appear 
in the enumerated list of instruments eligible for discount.
148
 
3.  The ABCP Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
(AMLF) 
i. Background 
We saw above that MMMFs faced difficulties in September 2008, 
once Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and the Reserve Primary Fund 
 
 144. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces 
Two Initiatives Designed to Bolster Market Liquidity and Promote Orderly Market 
Functioning (Mar. 16, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080316a.htm. 
 145. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Program Terms and 
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf_terms.html. 
 146. Id.  The Fed expanded the group of eligible securities on September 14.  Previously, 
the range of eligible collateral had included only investment-grade equities and securities (as 
well as collateral that could be pledged in the Fed‘s open-market operations).  See Press 
Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces Several 
Initiatives to Provide Additional Support to Financial Markets, Including Enhancements to 
its Existing Liquidity Facilities (Sept. 14, 2008),  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080914a.htm (announcing this 
change). 
 147. Fed. Red. Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Program Terms and 
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/pdcf_terms.html (stating that 
eligible collateral at the PDCF included ―all collateral eligible for pledge in triparty funding 
arrangements through the major clearing banks‖ which encompasses equity as well as debt).  
 148. See supra Part II.B. 
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―broke the buck‖.
149
  In response, on September 19, 2008,
150
 the Fed created 
the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) (and later, it also created the MMIFF, which we 
examined above).
151
 
The AMLF, which expired on February 1, 2010, sought to prevent 
other MMMFs from selling their asset-backed commercial paper in a 
falling market.  By doing so, they were increasing the demand for 
redemptions and heightening their liquidity problems.  The AMLF made 
non-recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies.  
These loans were used to purchase ABCP from MMMFs that were 
experiencing significant demands for redemption.
152
  The collateral for the 
loans was the purchased ABCP.
153
 
ii.  Assessment 
Initially, this structure appears to be similar to that involved in the 
Bear Stearns-JPMorgan transaction.  The Fed made a loan to an entity that 
used it to purchase assets.  These assets constituted the security for the 
loan.  Even so, we will conclude that this transaction actually came within 
the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority.  Why would this be the case? 
The answer is that here, there was no impermissible asset purchase by 
the Fed, or by an SPV controlled by the Fed.  Instead, the purchased ABCP 
was brought onto the balance sheets of the depository institutions rather 
than onto the balance sheet of a Fed-created entity.
154
 
In this way, the Fed did not exceed the bounds of its § 13(3) powers.  
It made loans to depository institutions.  They then purchased assets, which 
appeared on their own balance sheets.  Section 13(3) contemplates a loan 
transaction.  It does not then constrain what the borrower goes on to do 
with that loan.
155
  Overall, then, the loan/asset-purchase distinction was 
 
 149. See supra Part IV.A.3.i. 
 150. THE FED. RES., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER MONEY MARKET MUTUAL 
FUND LIQUIDITY FACILITY 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129amlf.pdf (describing the 
background, structure, and basic terms of the AMLF). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  MMMFs eligible to participate had to have experienced outflows of at least 5 
percent of net assets in a single day or at least 10 per cent of assets within the previous five 
business days. 
 153. Id. at 3.  Eligible ABCP had to be purchased after September 19, 2008.  Id.  It had 
to be issued by a U.S. entity, and to receive a high rating from a credit-rating agency.  Id.  
The maturity of the ABCP could not exceed 120 days (if banks were purchasing it) or 270 
days (if nonbanks were purchasing it).  Id. 
 154. Cf. Baxter, supra note 19, at 13 (describing purchases by the Fed‘s own SPVs). 
 155. Assuming that the borrower is not the Fed, which (as we have argued above) has the 
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met in this case. 
Is this analysis persuasive? One could argue in response that there is 
no difference in substance between the AMLF and the Bear Stearns-
JPMorgan transaction.  Maiden Lane is a distinct corporate entity.  It is just 
as separate from the Fed as are the financial institutions that borrowed 
under the AMLF.  But the counter-argument is that the Fed manages and 
controls Maiden Lane‘s assets.  In contrast, it has no control over the assets 
of the financial institutions that received loans under the AMLF. 
On the present facts, then, the Fed did not itself purchase ABCP from 
MMMFs in order to move this paper onto its own balance sheet and so 
make the purchase of an MMMF a more attractive prospect for another 
private party.  It made loans to financial institutions, so that they 
themselves could purchase ABCP and hence provide liquidity to MMMFs 
facing redemption. 
Even so, there remains a concern about a loan to the party that needs 
assistance.  The borrowers (the depository institutions) were not the parties 
that were unable to receive credit from elsewhere (the MMMFs).
156
 
4.  The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
i.  Background 
Securitization is a process by means of which entities can more easily 
transfer loans away from their balance sheets.
157
  First, they create pools of 
these loans.  Next, they sell interests in these pools to investors.  The 
interests take the form of securities.  This process can be advantageous for 
banks because they may then be able to originate further loans.  
Furthermore, investors in the securities may benefit from diversification 
because of their interests in a large underlying pool of assets. 
Asset-backed securities (ABS) derive value from their underlying 
assets.  Examples of ABS include securities created from automobile loans, 
credit card loans, and leases of equipment (but not, by convention, 
mortgage-backed securities, which are referred to separately as MBS).
158
 
In October 2008, new issues of ABS came to a halt.  The Fed was 
concerned because, as it pointed out, ABS markets ―historically have 
 
specific statutory power under § 13(3) to make secured loans, and not to purchase assets. 
 156. It is possible to argue that the depository institutions would themselves have faced 
difficulties obtaining credit had the pressures faced by the MMMFs not been resolved, but 
this argument is forward-looking and does not appear to be persuasive.  The AMLF was 
created at a time when the MMMFs were the parties facing difficulties obtaining credit from 
elsewhere.  The transaction sought to respond to the MMMFs‘ liquidity concerns, not those 
of the banks. 
 157. See SCOTT II, supra note 119, at 568-574 (discussing asset securitization and issues 
that the financial crisis has raised with respect to credit markets). 
 158. Id. 
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funded a substantial share of credit to consumers and businesses.‖
159
  
Disruption of these markets could, in its view, ―significantly limit the 
availability of credit to households and businesses of all sizes,‖ and so 
contribute to a further weakening of economic activity.
160
  In order to 
reopen the ABS markets, and to further promote the flow of credit to 
businesses and households, the Fed created the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) on November 25, 2008.
161
  It expired on 
June 30, 2010.
162
 
The TALF made loans to investors who purchased AAA-rated ABS.
163
  
The securities themselves served as collateral for these loans, which were 
made without recourse.
164
  Up to $200 billion was allocated to the 
facility.
165
  Securities eligible for purchase included automobile loans, 
credit card loans, and student loans.
166
  After an expansion of the program, 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) also became eligible for 
purchase.
167
 
Each loan was subject to a haircut.  This haircut provided some 
protection to the Fed.  It also ensured that investors retained some monetary 
stake in their purchases.  In the event that investors did not repay their 
loans, the Fed could sell their securities to TALF LLC, an SPV that it 
created.
168
  The Treasury agreed to bear the first $20 billion of losses by 
this SPV, by providing it with a loan in this amount.  The Fed bore the 
remainder.
169
 
 
 159. Fed. Red. Bank of N.Y., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Frequently 
Asked Questions (July 21, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_faq.html. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces 
the Creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm. 
 162. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 159. 
 163. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Terms and 
Conditions  (July 21, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_terms.html 
[hereinafter Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. II]. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  Also included were loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, 
loans relating to business equipment, leases of vehicle fleets, and insurance premium 
finance loans.  Id. 
 167. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces 
that Certain High-Quality Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities will become Eligible 
Collateral under the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090519b.htm. 
 168. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. II, supra note 163. 
 169. Id.  After the program closed to new lending on June 30, 2010, this commitment 
was later reduced to $4.3 billion.  Id. 
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ii.  Assessment 
The TALF appears to have come within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) 
authority.  The appropriate analysis is similar to that which we set out 
above in the case of the AMLF.
170
  The Fed did not itself purchase 
securities and bring them onto its own balance sheet.  Instead, the Fed 
sought to facilitate purchases of ABS by other private investors.  For this 
reason, the transactional structure is not the same as those that we 
considered in the SPV cases above, where the Fed‘s SPV acquired the 
assets at the outset. 
However, there remains a concern about a loan to the party that needs 
assistance.  The borrowers (the private investors) were not the parties who 
were unable to receive credit from elsewhere (those seeking to issue and 
sell ABS). 
C.  No legal authority: Lehman Brothers 
Above, we considered a number of cases in which the Fed effected 
both asset purchases and loan transactions.  In all of these cases, the Fed 
invoked its § 13(3) authority.  However, there remains one important case 
in which the Fed took no action under the statute.  This is the case of 
Lehman Brothers. 
1. Background 
Lehman Brothers (―Lehman‖) was an investment bank that made large 
investments in MBS.  Like Bear Stearns, it started to face significant 
liquidity problems when its creditors refused to lend against its assets.  On 
September 10, 2008, it announced a $3.9 billion quarterly loss.
171
  Its shares 
had fallen 45% the previous day, and more than 90% since the beginning of 
the year.
172
 
The Fed did not use § 13(3) to provide credit to Lehman.  Lehman 
subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.  The 
Fed had made certain attempts to prevent this outcome.  It has been stated 
that the Fed tried to find a buyer for Lehman, and that there were two 
potential candidates:  Barclays Bank (―Barclays‖) and Bank of America.  
Bank of America, however, eventually declined to enter into a deal – 
 
 170. See supra Part IV.B.3.ii (analyzing the transactional structure of the AMLF). 
 171. Ben White, Lehman sees $3.9 billion loss and plans to shed assets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/10/business/worldbusiness/10iht-
11lehman.16037408.html. 
 172. Id. 
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possibly because it sought greater assistance than that which the 
government was willing to provide.
173
  At the time, Bank of America was 
also in negotiations to purchase Merrill Lynch.  On September 14, 2008, it 
announced that it would do so. 
Thereafter, Barclays was the only remaining candidate.  The Fed 
declined to provide any public funding to Barclays.  Instead, it put together 
a consortium of investment banks.
174
  This consortium agreed to lend 
billions of dollars to an SPV created by the Fed that would acquire 
Lehman‘s illiquid assets.  Barclays would then purchase Lehman‘s 
remaining assets.
175
 
However, there was a difficulty with the proposed transaction.  Any 
deal between Barclays and Lehman would take more than a month to close 
after the contract had been signed.  The Treasury insisted that Barclays 
guarantee Lehman‘s trading obligations in the interim.  Its concern was that 
Lehman‘s partners would otherwise cease to do business with the firm, and 
so render it worthless.
176
  Under U.K. stock-exchange listing rules, Barclays 
would have to hold a shareholder vote before it could provide a 
guarantee.
177
  However, there was insufficient time to hold such a vote.  It 
has also been suggested that the U.K. Financial Services Authority, after 
consulting with the U.K. government, refused to waive this requirement.
178
 
Ultimately, Lehman‘s holding company filed for bankruptcy.  
However, while the proceedings were ongoing, Lehman‘s broker-dealer, 
financed by loans from the PDCF, continued to operate.
179
  In the course of 
the bankruptcy, Barclays ultimately purchased this broker-dealer (as well 
as Lehman‘s U.S. office) for $1.75 billion.
180
 
We can put forward two views about the Fed‘s decision-making in 
Lehman‘s case.  The first is a view that the Fed has expressed publicly:  
that it had no legal authority to save Lehman.  The second is that the Fed 
did have this legal authority, but chose not to use it.  We will examine each 
of these views in turn. 
 
 173. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 279, 300, 319 (2009) (stating that 
Bank of America offered to share the first $1 billion of losses on Lehman‘s assets with the 
government.  It asked the government to bear a further $40 billion of losses, and later raised 
this figure to $70 billion). 
 174. Id. at 302-03 (describing one of the working groups created to develop a structure 
for investment in the failing bank). 
 175. Id. at 336 (stating that the consortium agreed to provide $33 billion in order to 
absorb losses, so that Barclays could then acquire $3.5 billion of Lehman‘s more liquid 
assets). 
 176. Id. at 324. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 346, 348 (suggesting that the U.K. government was concerned about 
Lehman's exposure to risk and the limited information available in the circumstances). 
 179. Id. at 358. 
 180. Id. at 454-55. 
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i.  The Fed did not have the legal authority to save Lehman 
In an October 2009 presentation at Harvard Law School, Thomas C. 
Baxter, Jr., General Counsel to the New York FRB, set out the Fed‘s view 
of its own legal authority.  The Fed concluded that it could use § 13(3) to 
lend and to purchase assets, but that it could not use it to provide an 
ongoing guarantee for a private merger agreement.
181
 
Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Fed‘s Board of Governors, had put 
forward a different analysis based not on the absence of a guarantee but on 
the inadequacy of Lehman‘s collateral.  In a December 2008 speech in 
Austin, he stated that Lehman‘s available collateral ―fell well short of the 
amount needed to secure a Federal Reserve loan sufficient to pay off the 
firm‘s counterparties and continue operations.‖
182
  He contrasted Lehman‘s 
case with that of AIG, where there was sufficient collateral, and that of 
Bear Stearns, where JPMorgan was willing to provide a guarantee of the 
firm‘s trading obligations.  Bernanke concluded that Lehman‘s failure was 
―unavoidable, given the legal constraints.‖
183
 
ii. The Fed did have the legal authority to save Lehman, but 
did not use it 
Other commentators point to political rather than legal constraints.  
They put forward the idea that the Fed may have had the legal authority to 
save Lehman, but that it chose not to use it.
184
  In support, they cite 
statements by Treasury and Fed officials at the time of Lehman‘s 
bankruptcy. 
For example, Hank Paulson, then Treasury Secretary, gave a press 
conference on September 15, 2008 at which he stated that he ―never once 
considered that it was appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in 
resolving Lehman Brothers.‖
185
  Furthermore, when speaking before the 
Senate Committee on Banking later in September 2008, Ben Bernanke 
 
 181. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Address at Harvard Law School‘s International Finance Seminar: Lessons Learned From the 
Financial Crisis, Address (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Baxter II]. 
 182. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Remarks at the Greater Austin 
Chamber of Commerce, Austin, Texas (Dec. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See SORKIN, supra note 173, at 303 (stating that Timothy Geithner ―reiterated 
[Hank] Paulson‘s decree: ‗There is no political will for a federal bailout.‘‖); WESSEL, supra 
note 65, at 21-24 (describing the political pressure brought to bear on Paulson and Bernanke 
after the rescue of Bear Stearns and quoting statements by a Fed official to the effect that a 
decision was made to let Lehman fail). 
 185. Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
16, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122152314746339697.html. 
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stated that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury ―declined to commit 
public funds‖ to support Lehman.
186
  Although Lehman‘s failure posed 
risks, its troubles ―had been well known for some time, and investors 
clearly recognized . . . that the failure of the firm was a significant 
possibility.‖
187
  Thus, the Fed ―judged that investors and counterparties had 
had time to take precautionary measures.‖
188
  It can be argued that these 
comments reflect a deliberate political decision to let Lehman fail.
189
  
Nevertheless, the Fed has not made any statement to this exact effect.  In 
fact, in his October 2009 presentation, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., categorically 
stated that no policymaker made a decision to let Lehman fail.
190
  One final 
point made by commentators is that the Fed and the Treasury may have 
prepared no alternatives to the Barclays transaction because they had 
expected this deal to succeed.
191
 
2. Assessment 
An assessment of the claim that Lehman‘s failure was rooted in 
political rather than legal decision-making goes beyond the scope of the 
present analysis.  We also lack the information necessary to make such an 
assessment.  We shall therefore take the Fed‘s legal claims at face value 
and evaluate only these.  The first is that the Fed did not have the legal 
authority to guarantee Lehman‘s ongoing obligations.  Insofar as § 13(3) is 
concerned with the provision of individual loans, this conclusion may be 
correct. 
However, we can make two points in response.  First, the Fed‘s 
approach is not dispositive.  The logically prior question is whether the 
ongoing guarantee of Lehman‘s assets – on which the Fed insisted – was 
necessary in the first place.  It is true that in the case of Bear Stearns, 
JPMorgan did provide such a guarantee to creditors.  The private 
 
 186. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Remarks before the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Sept. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080923a1.htm) (emphasis 
added). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  A related point that Bernanke does not make expressly is that Lehman had had 
access to the PDCF since March 16, 2008, and so would have been able to borrow from the 
Fed if it had chosen to do so.  See ROSS SORKIN, supra note 173, at 285 (―At least in the 
Bear case, there was some legitimate fear of systemic risk.  The Federal Reserve‘s discount 
window hadn‘t yet been opened to investment banks, and so there was some chance of a 
larger liquidity panic.‖) (quoting Lehman’s Fate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at A16, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122117590254125801.html). 
 189. See SORKIN, supra note 173, at 282 (suggesting that Paulson sought to avoid the 
―political liability of putting up government money for Lehman.‖). 
 190. Baxter II, supra note 181. 
 191. WESSEL, supra note 65, at 21. 
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consortium in Lehman‘s case, on the other hand, did not.  Its members only 
agreed to acquire Lehman‘s illiquid assets so that Barclays could purchase 
the rest.  However, no such ongoing guarantee was given in the case of 
AIG.  This renders questionable the argument that such a guarantee was 
necessary. 
The second point is that the Fed could conceivably have made a large 
series of loans to Lehman under § 13(3).  These loans would have had the 
same effect as that of an ongoing guarantee, ensuring that Lehman 
continued to trade until the deal with Barclays closed.  However, the 
counter-argument is that such a step would not have been helpful.  The 
market had lost confidence in Lehman‘s ability to trade.  For this reason, 
providing a series of loans would not have resolved Lehman‘s 
difficulties.
192
  This approach, however, moves away from arguments about 
legal authority and towards arguments about practicality and 
appropriateness of response.  It does not convincingly demonstrate that a 
series of loans would certainly have exceeded the limits of § 13(3). 
The Fed‘s second claim, as articulated by Ben Bernanke, is more 
persuasive.  This is the claim that Lehman‘s assets would not have 
provided sufficient collateral for a § 13(3) loan.  We have seen that § 13(3) 
requires financial instruments to be secured to the satisfaction of a Reserve 
Bank.  Therefore, a decision that a security constitutes insufficient 
collateral is one that a Reserve Bank is entitled to make. 
However, we can once more make two points in response.  First, we 
might question whether Lehman‘s assets would have remained insufficient 
even after the private consortium had acquired its illiquid assets.  It is 
conceivable that after the involvement of the consortium, the Fed could 
have guaranteed Lehman‘s trading obligations until the Barclays deal 
closed.  But the counter-argument is that the decision not to do so was 
ultimately a judgment within the scope of the Fed‘s discretion.  Again, we 
lack the information necessary to assess the quality of Lehman‘s assets as 
against those of Bear Stearns, or those of AIG, to which the Fed provided 
credit one day later. 
The second argument is stronger.  Under the CPFF, the Fed purchased 
unsecured commercial paper from issuers.
193
   Lehman‘s collateral, 
insufficient though it might have been, would certainly have constituted 
better security for a loan than an issuer‘s promise to pay.
194
 
 
 192. Baxter II, supra note 181. 
 193. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 194. But see supra Part IV.A.2.ii (suggesting that the CPFF fees did constitute some 
security for the loan). 
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V.  CONGRESS‘S VISION FOR § 13(3): THE CASE FOR REFORM 
So far, the purpose of our analysis has been to assess the Fed‘s actions 
during the financial crisis against its statutory powers.  We have argued that 
§ 13(3) did not support the interpretative weight that the Fed then sought to 
bring to bear on it.  Where does this conclusion lead us? 
One answer is that the point should be recognized expressly.  Various 
people associated with the Fed have made statements acknowledging that it 
reached the bounds of its legislative mandate.  For example, former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker said that the Fed ―judged it necessary to 
take actions that [extended] to the very edge of its lawful and implied 
powers.‖
195
  On the other hand, in 2009, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., stated that 
the Fed ―will do whatever it takes, within the bounds of the law, to deal 
with [the] financial crisis.‖
196
  The conclusion of this Article is rather 
different:  that the Fed not only reached the bounds of its legislative 
powers, but that it exceeded them. 
Another answer is that it had become necessary to alter the legislation.  
One option would have been to amend § 13(3) in order to give the Fed the 
powers it sought to assume during the crisis.  However, Congress, in 
passing the Dodd-Frank Act, chose a different approach.  This legislation 
has made a number of important amendments to § 13(3).  When we come 
to analyze these below, we will see that they resolve a number of concerns 
about the statute, even though others do remain. 
To help us evaluate the reforms, we shall first set out the 
counterfactual.  What was the case for reform before Congress acted?  In 
particular, what vision did the legislature have for § 13(3) and how did the 
Fed‘s activity depart from that vision?  Once we have asked these 
questions, we will be in a position to consider what effects the reforms 
have had and whether they have been successful. 
A. The Intended Purpose of § 13(3) 
Let us begin by asking what vision Congress might have had in 
enacting § 13(3).  How was it intended to be used?  We saw above that the 
section allowed the Fed, in times of emergency, to make secured loans to 
entities that could not obtain credit from elsewhere.  What sort of entities 
might these be? 
Commercial banks have always been able to borrow at the Fed‘s 
discount window, and so they have no need for § 13(3).  Investment banks, 
 
 195. Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 671, 723 [hereinafter Scott III] (noting former Chairman 
Volcker‘s concerns that the financial system had failed the test of the marketplace). 
 196. Baxter II, supra note 181. 
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however, were not eligible for discount window loans at the time of the 
crisis.  As corporations, though, they were eligible for § 13(3) loans:  either 
by means of individual bailouts or under the PDCF.  Even so, it should be 
pointed out that the largest investment banks that survived the crisis are 
now bank holding companies.
197
  As such, they can now borrow at the 
discount window at any time.  They are also subject to the Fed‘s oversight. 
There remains one residual category:  that of § 13(3) lending to 
nonbanks.  Under what sort of circumstances might the legislature have 
envisaged this occurring?  The most appropriate recipients of § 13(3) loans 
would seem to be nonbanks with some significant connection to the 
financial system.  From the Fed‘s perspective, this is surely the most 
relevant sense of ―unusual and exigent‖ circumstances.  It is true, as we 
saw above in our survey of the history of § 13(3) lending, that the Fed did 
extend credit to industrial (rather than financial) nonbanks between 1932 
and 1936.  Even so, such industrial lending was limited in scope, and the 
Fed ceded its role in this area to other entities.
198
  At present, it no longer 
seems possible to conceive of the Fed‘s making a loan to a nonbank unless 
the failure of such an entity would have a significant effect on the financial 
system. 
B. Systemic risk 
It follows from the above analysis that the concern underlying § 13(3) 
was one about systemic risk.  According to Scott, this term has two 
meanings.  First, there is the chain reaction problem:  the possibility that 
the failure of one entity will affect others.  More precisely, this is the risk 
that ―the failure of one significant financial institution [might] cause or 
significantly contribute to the failure of other significant financial 
institutions as a result of their linkages to each other.‖
199
 
Second, there is the possibility of an exogenous shock that may have a 
simultaneous impact on a number of financial institutions.  These sources 
of systemic risk are related:  an exogenous shock can trigger a chain 
reaction.  At the time of the crisis, § 13(3) had an entity-specific focus that 
permitted lending to individual entities as well as to groups.  In this way, it 
was well positioned to address both of these concerns. 
Scott goes on to set out three causes of financial chain reactions.
200
  
First, there are imitative runs.  Here, after a bank fails, depositors in another 
 
 197. Namely Bank of America (which acquired Merrill Lynch), Goldman Sachs, 
JPMorgan (which acquired Bear Stearns), and Morgan Stanley. 
 198. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 199. See Scott III, supra note 195, at 673 (discussing the reduction of systemic risk, and 
noting that this is the central problem for financial regulation). 
 200. See SCOTT, supra note 94, at 11-12; see also Scott III, supra note 195, at 673–75. 
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bank assume that their bank will also fail, and so they withdraw their funds.  
Second, there are interbank deposits, where one bank places its deposits 
with another.  Finally, there is counterparty risk, or interconnectedness.  
Scott points out that when we are considering nonbanks, this is the most 
relevant source of systemic risk.
201
  Here, an institution may fail because its 
counterparty cannot settle a derivative position.  Even so, the extent of 
losses (and failures) will depend on the value of the collateral that the 
institution holds.
202
 
What effects can systemic risk (and actions taken to prevent it) have?  
One is a governmental bailout made at the taxpayers‘ expense.  Another is 
an increase in moral hazard.  This is the concern that private institutions 
that have been rescued by the government, or know that they will be, may 
become less concerned about the effects of their own risk-taking.  They 
may take fewer steps to protect themselves against future losses. 
Section 13(3) contained an important means of protection against 
moral hazard.  Entities receiving loans had to provide satisfactory 
collateral.  The Fed could also look to the assets of the borrower in the 
event of a shortfall.  In this way, the borrower, and not the Fed, would still 
bear the main effects of its own risk-taking.  Moreover, by making loans 
only against satisfactory collateral, the Fed was also less likely to 
experience losses.  Thus, overall, the conditions for lending in § 13(3) 
sought not only reduce moral hazard but also to protect the Fed itself. 
It appears persuasive to say that at the time of the crisis and 
beforehand, § 13(3) sought to contain systemic risk.  But we must qualify 
our conclusion in one important respect.  Section 13(3) as enacted sought 
only to contain systemic liquidity risks.  For this reason, the Fed‘s role as a 
systemic risk regulator was embryonic.  When faced with the problem of a 
chain reaction or an exogenous shock, the Fed could, according to the 
statute, respond only by lending against satisfactory collateral.  But during 
the crisis, the Fed in fact used § 13(3) to respond to systemic insolvency 
risks.  It took on the role of systemic risk regulator as such, despite the 
confines of the statute and its duties as a central bank. 
One possible response is to argue that the flexibility that § 13(3) 
provided to the Fed during the financial crisis proved advantageous.  The 
Fed was able to act quickly, long before Congress enacted EESA on 
 
 201. See SCOTT, supra note 94, at 12 (acknowledging that it is difficult to estimate the 
severity of this form of risk, as well as the degree of interconnectedness among institutions). 
 202. For example, in March 2009, Goldman Sachs stated publicly that it had adequate 
collateral to protect itself against the consequences of a default by AIG.  Scott III, supra 
note 195, at 675.  Despite this, Goldman Sachs received the largest portion of the Fed‘s $85 
billion loan to AIG.  Id.  Perhaps, then, AIG‘s rescue did not follow from concerns about 
systemic risk as such but rather from concerns about the losses that AIG‘s investors would 
have had to bear if the firm had failed. 
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October 3, 2008.
203
  However, the Fed also made a series of ad hoc 
decisions, rescuing some entities and letting others fail.  And so the other 
argument, with which Congress appears to have agreed, is that these 
actions were problematic.  A dedicated systemic risk regulator, had one 
existed at the time, may have been able to act more quickly and coherently.  
In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act creates such a specialized entity.  We will 
return to consider its role below.
204
 
C. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
1.  Overview: The Amendments to § 13(3) 
We are now in a position to examine the amendments to § 13(3) 
contained in the Dodd-Frank Act.  This legislation makes a number of 
changes to § 13(3).  First, it sets out a clear vision of § 13(3) and its 
function.  Second, it prohibits lending to single and specific entities.  Third, 
it seeks to ensure that the Fed receives sufficient collateral for its loans.  
Fourth, it requires input by the Treasury into the Fed‘s decision-making.  
Finally, it sets out detailed reporting obligations.  We will examine each of 
these points in turn. 
The first point concerns the newly stated purpose of the legislation.  
As amended, § 13(3) now states that future emergency lending will occur 
under a set of policies and procedures (to be established by regulation) 
designed to ensure that ―any emergency lending program or facility is for 
the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system.‖
205
 
The second point is that the Fed can no longer lend to ―any individual, 
partnership, or corporation.‖  Instead, it can discount notes, drafts, and bills 
of exchange for ―any participant in any program or facility with broad-
based eligibility.‖
206
  Hence the Fed can no longer make loans to individual 
entities.  It cannot, by its emergency lending programs and procedures, 
seek to ―aid a failing financial company,‖ or to ―remove assets from the 
balance sheet of a single and specific company.‖
207
  Nor can it seek to help 
a single and specific company avoid bankruptcy.
208
 
This point is further emphasized by one of the criteria that the 
Comptroller General must use when exercising his new powers to audit § 
13(3) facilities (which we will discuss in greater detail below).  The 
 
 203. The House of Representatives had earlier rejected EESA in bill form on September 
29, 2008.  Office of the Clerk, H.R., Final Vote Results for Roll Call (Sept. 29, 2008), 674, 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/roll674.xml. 
 204. See infra Part V.C.2.iii. 
 205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 
5301 (2010). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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Comptroller must consider whether the credit facility ―inappropriately 
favors one or more specific participants over other institutions eligible to 
utilize the facility.‖
209
 
The third amendment concerns collateral.  The test in the previous 
legislation is preserved.  Once more, the financial instruments to be 
discounted must be endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the 
Federal Reserve Bank.  However, further guidance now accompanies this 
test.  In determining whether a loan is satisfactorily secured, Reserve Banks 
must now assign a ―lendable value‖ to all collateral that they receive for 
their loans, in a manner consistent with ―sound risk management 
practices.‖
210
  The security for emergency loans must be ―sufficient to 
protect taxpayers from losses.‖
211
  Insolvent borrowers are expressly 
prohibited from borrowing under the Fed‘s § 13(3) programs.  We saw 
above, when considering the distinction between targeted individual loans 
and programs of broad-based eligibility, that the Fed cannot seek to aid 
failing financial companies or to help them avoid bankruptcy. 
The fourth amendment to § 13(3) ensures future executive input into 
the Fed‘s decision-making.  Before the Fed can establish any § 13(3) 
program or facility, it must now obtain the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.
212
 
Finally, by its other provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to ensure 
that the Fed‘s past and future § 13(3) decision-making is made more 
transparent.
213
  The Comptroller General now obtains the power to conduct 
reviews and on-site examinations of the Fed, its Reserve Banks, and its 
credit facilities, such as the SPVs established under § 13(3).
214
  The 
Comptroller General may also assess the Fed‘s discount window lending 
and its open-market operations.  The relevant criteria are the adequacy of 
financial reporting, the effectiveness of security and collateral policies, and, 
as we have seen, whether the facilities inappropriately favor one or more 
specific participants over others.
215
 
The Government Accountability Office is also to conduct a one-time 
audit of all the Fed‘s actions from December 1, 2007 until the date of the 
 
 209. Id. at § 1102. 
 210. Id. at § 1101. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Previous legislation had already sought to address such concerns.  EESA § 129 
required that the Fed, within seven days of invoking § 13(3), provide Congress with a report 
justifying its actions and stating the terms under which it lent.  Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 § 129 (2008).  It had to update these reports every sixty days.  Id.  
But this obligation was limited in duration.  It covered only the period from March 1, 2008 
to October 3, 2008.  Id. 
 214. Dodd-Frank Act § 1102. 
 215. Id. 
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legislation‘s enactment.
216
  This audit will cover all of the Fed‘s § 13(3) 
activities.  The Fed itself is also subject to new disclosure obligations.  By 
December 1, 2010, it must publish on its website various details about its 
past § 13(3) programs, such as the identity of those who received 
assistance, the value of that assistance, and the specific rationale for each 
program.
217
  The Fed will also be required to disclose information about its 
future § 13(3) activities, and to publish this on its website after the 
termination of its programs.
218
 
2. Assessment 
We have seen that the Dodd-Frank Act makes a number of wide-
ranging modifications to § 13(3).  Overall, we will argue that these are to 
be welcomed.  Our analysis will proceed in three parts.  First, we will set 
out one remaining caveat as to the loan/asset-purchase distinction, the 
status of which appears to remain ambiguous in the legislation.  Second, we 
will evaluate the thrust of the changes that the Act makes and attempt to 
explain these in the light of the concerns we have previously raised.  Third, 
we will touch upon the systemic risk problem.  We will seek to 
demonstrate that § 13(3) has now resumed the role it was intended to have:  
that of regulating systemic liquidity risks. 
i. A remaining ambiguity in the legislation 
Throughout our analysis, we have argued that § 13(3) provides the 
Fed with defined powers of limited scope.  It may lend freely against 
sufficient collateral, which is the classic function of a central bank.
219
  In 
this way, it can provide liquidity to entities that are otherwise solvent.  We 
have also sought to demonstrate that § 13(3) does not support the full scope 
of the Fed‘s past activity.  Although the statute permits only secured 
lending, the Fed also invoked it to purchase assets. 
Does the current provision address this concern?  It might, but the 
point remains ambiguous.  The newly amended § 13(3) preserves the basic 
structure of the previous legislation.  Once more, the Fed can discount 
financial instruments for entities that cannot secure adequate credit from 
 
 216. Id. at § 1109. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at § 1103. 
 219. KENNETH N. KUTTNER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AS LENDER OF LAST RESORT DURING 
THE PANIC OF 2008 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The_Federal_Reserve_as_Lender_of_Last_Resort_during_
the_Panic_of_2008.pdf (explaining that ―[t]here is a long history of central banks providing 
liquidity during banking panics‖ and setting out Bagehot‘s view that a lender of last resort 
should lend freely, but at a penalty rate, against good collateral). 
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other banks.  The amending legislation states that § 13(3) is a provision 
about the Fed‘s ―emergency lending authority.‖
220
  It also states that the Fed 
cannot use it to ―remove assets from the balance sheet of a single and 
specific company.‖
221
  These provisions appear to support the loan/asset-
purchase distinction that we have drawn throughout our analysis. 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the main emphasis of 
these provisions lies elsewhere.  Their purpose may be to ensure that the 
Fed cannot discriminate between entities that are equally in need of 
assistance.  On this view, the Fed is prohibited from removing assets from 
the balance sheet of a single and specific company – not from purchasing 
assets per se. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Fed is still exercising its 
―emergency lending powers‖ when it incorporates an SPV and then makes 
loans to it for the purpose of purchasing assets.  In fact, the amended 
statute, with its requirement that the Fed establish schemes of ―broad-based 
eligibility,‖ may even contemplate such asset purchases – so long as they 
occur on a wide scale. 
In other words, Congress‘s main concern may have been about the 
distinction that the Fed drew between Bear Stearns, AIG, and issuers of 
commercial paper on the one hand and Lehman on the other.  Hence the 
thrust of the newly amended legislation may be to proscribe arbitrary 
decision-making rather than asset purchasing as such.  If this is the correct 
reading of Congress‘s intention, then this Article suggests that the true 
interpretation of the statute should be otherwise.  To the extent that the Fed 
uses § 13(3) to circumvent restrictions elsewhere in the FRA, it exceeds the 
bounds of its statutory authority. 
Why do we emphasize this point?  There are two reasons.  These are 
equally applicable in situations where the Fed lends against insufficient 
collateral and where it purchases assets.  The first concern is political.  The 
money that the Fed lends out under § 13(3) is not appropriated by the 
conventional process.  Furthermore, during the financial crisis, there was 
no formal requirement for any executive supervision over the Fed‘s loan-
making activity. 
The second concern is economic.  To make a loan, the Fed prints 
money, and so inserts high-powered money into the financial system.
222
  To 
offset the effects of this increase in reserves, which would otherwise lead to 
inflation, the Fed has to sell Treasury bills in the open market.  In this way, 
 
 220. Id. at § 1101 (emphasis added). 
 221. Id. (emphasis added). 
 222. Unless it lends out Treasury bills against privately issued securities such as 
performed at the TSLF.  See supra Part IV.B.1.  This exchange of securities has no effect on 
the amount of reserves in the financial system.  KUTTNER, supra note 219, at 5. 
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it reduces the amount of money in the system.
223
  The difficulty is that the 
Fed has a limited supply of Treasury bills.  When its own supply runs out it 
must seek more from the Treasury.
224
  But if the Fed becomes reliant on the 
Treasury, it may no longer enjoy the same degree of independence to carry 
out monetary policy.
225
 
For these reasons, we might argue that the Fed should have no 
authority to lend against insufficient collateral and to purchase assets.  
These powers, if ever to be exercised, should go to another entity, such as 
the Treasury.  Such a step would ensure that funds are appropriated through 
the political process.  It would also ensure that bailouts do not have an 
adverse effect on the money supply, because the Treasury can finance its 
own spending with debt. 
Congress has now accepted the first limb of this argument, seeking to 
preclude the Fed‘s lending against insufficient collateral, but perhaps not 
the second, which cautions against asset purchases.  Even so, we can point 
out that under the new statute, asset purchases by means of an SPV 
structure would now be subject to stringent collateral requirements.  In this 
way, our concerns may now have been mitigated.  Furthermore, there is 
now executive input into the § 13(3) process, in the form of approval by the 
Secretary of the Treasury.  Therefore, the most important remaining 
concern may be about legal authority. 
ii. A return to the lender of last resort model 
Lending freely against sufficient collateral,
226
 and so acting as a lender 
of last resort, is one of the classic functions of a central bank.
227
  By its 
actions, the central bank seeks to address liquidity concerns.  It allows 
solvent banks to keep operating when they would otherwise fail for lack of 
reserves.  We saw above that the Fed‘s lending to banks takes place at its 
discount window.  The satisfactory collateral requirement in § 13(3) went 
 
 223. In October 2008, after the enactment of EESA, the Fed was permitted to pay 
interest on bank reserves.  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 § 128 (2008).  This 
is another method of decreasing the amount of money in the system, because it encourages 
banks to deposit money with the Fed. 
 224. In fact, during the financial crisis, the Treasury operated its Supplementary 
Financing Program.  It sold Treasury bills in the open market and deposited the proceeds 
with the Federal Reserve.  Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t. of Treasury, Treasury Announces 
Supplementary Financing Program (Sept. 17, 2008), 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1144.htm. 
 225. In response, we might question the extent to which the Fed really is independent.  
Commentators suggest that the Treasury played a significant role in shaping the Fed‘s 
actions (under § 13(3) and otherwise) during the financial crisis.  See generally, e.g., 
SORKIN, supra note 173; WESSEL, supra note 65. . 
 226. But at a penalty rate.  KUTTNER, supra note 219, at 1. 
 227. Id. 
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some way towards aligning the Fed‘s role as a regulator for systemic 
liquidity risks with its role as lender of last resort at the discount window.
228
 
However, we also saw that the statutory terms at the time of the crisis 
were imprecise.  Was ―secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve 
Bank‖
229
 an entirely subjective test?  We pointed out above that it could 
conceivably require no collateral.  But we argued that it could not operate 
in this way:  at the very least, the borrower would have to provide some 
security.
230
 
What about transactions in which the Fed made § 13(3) loans against 
collateral of low quality?  These would appear to have been acceptable 
under the terms of the statute at the time the Fed used it.  In such cases, by 
definition, there is a substantial likelihood that the loan will not be repaid in 
full.  Consequently, the Fed is likely to incur losses.  These are ultimately 
borne by the taxpayer, because the Fed remits the profits it makes to the 
Treasury.
231
 
The Dodd-Frank Act responds to these concerns.  It realigns § 13(3) 
once more with the classic function of a central bank:  lending freely 
against sufficient collateral.  As we saw above, the provision‘s expressly 
stated purpose is now to help the Fed provide liquidity to the financial 
system.  The Act also seeks to clarify the ambiguity as to collateral in the 
previous legislation.  Satisfactory collateral is that which is sufficient to 
protect taxpayers from losses.
232
  A Reserve Bank is required to apply 
―lendable values‖ to all the collateral it receives,
233
 so it can no longer be 
argued that the test is wholly subjective. 
The approach taken in the Dodd-Frank Act is preferable to that in the 
earlier House Bill, which has been discarded.  For the purposes of that Bill, 
in order to meet the ―secured to the satisfaction‖ standard, a Reserve 
Bank‘s governors would have to have believed there was a ―99 percent 
likelihood‖ that both the interest and the principal on the relevant loan 
would be repaid.
234
  The Bill would also have capped § 13(3) lending at $4 
 
 228. In the case of nonbanks, the Fed‘s loans seek to provide liquidity in the sense of 
short-term funding, rather than in the sense of reserves.  Id. at 4. 
 229. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3) (emphasis added). 
 230. See supra Part II.F. 
 231. For example, in 2009, the Fed made a profit of $52.1 billion.  Of this, $46.1 billion 
went to the Treasury.  Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Reserve Bank 
Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the Treasury for 2009 (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20100112a.htm. 
 232. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 
5301 (2010). Presumably, the collateral must be sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses 
as to both the principal and the interest, but the provision does not specify this. 
 233. Id. 
 234. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th 
Cong. § 1701 (2009). 
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trillion.
235
  Finally, in order to lend under § 13(3), the Fed would have 
required the approval not only of the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
President but also of the majority of the members of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC).
236
 
These rejected proposals would have set out a series of high 
procedural hurdles for the Fed to meet before it could engage in lending.  
They would also have capped the extent of its lending powers.  However, 
as Scott points out, after we put in place appropriate restrictions on 
collateral, there is little need for other procedural hurdles.
237
  Again, one of 
the functions of a central bank is to provide liquidity in times of 
emergency.  The extent to which we should politicize the Fed‘s ordinary 
activities (when it makes loans against sufficient collateral) is therefore 
questionable. 
On this view, we might also wish to question whether the Dodd-Frank 
Act ought to have incorporated the requirement for the Fed to seek 
Treasury approval before it can make § 13(3) loans.  The most persuasive 
response is that this may be a helpful check, and that approval is unlikely to 
be withheld in the appropriate circumstances. 
iii. Systemic risk regulation 
Above, we suggested § 13(3) has always been concerned with the 
provision of liquidity to the financial system.  However, during the 
financial crisis, the Fed used it in a different way.  By creating SPVs to 
purchase assets, the Fed assumed the role of a regulator for systemic 
solvency risks. 
The problem is that § 13(3) as it then stood did not provide an 
overarching framework for systemic risk regulation.  It was susceptible to 
use on an ad hoc basis, and the Fed did so use it during the crisis.  As a 
result, it is difficult to draw from its actions any coherent set of principles 
by which to predict future decision-making.  On the other hand, it is 
arguable that predictability in decision-making was necessarily difficult to 
achieve given the time constraints and the complexity of the crisis. 
The concern about ad hoc (and perhaps arbitrary) decision-making 
explains one of the key changes made to § 13(3) by the Dodd-Frank Act.  
We saw above that the Act prohibits lending to single and specific entities.  
The Fed can instead establish only programs of broad-based eligibility.  
 
 235. Id.  Although it was not clear whether this referred to any given loan transaction or 
to loans made over a certain period (such as the lifetime of the provision). 
 236. Id.; infra Part V.C.2.iii. 
 237. See Scott III, supra note 195, at 725 (―To the extent that the Federal Reserve is 
loaning against adequate high quality collateral, these procedural safeguards are overkill and 
unnecessarily limit the independence and flexibility of the Fed to respond to crisis.‖). 
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But, given all that we have said above about the permissible containment of 
systemic liquidity risks, does this modification not appear problematic?  
Let us imagine that we are faced with a chain reaction problem.  Only one 
entity is illiquid and so requires a loan.  However, if it fails, many others 
will also fail.  Here, providing credit to that entity alone would be precisely 
the right step to take.  But § 13(3) as amended precludes the Fed from 
taking such a step. 
There are two possible responses to the concern we have just raised.  
The first is to say that it will be rare for one institution alone to require 
help.  For this reason, it is usually of greater help to the financial system 
when the Fed develops wider-reaching programs for a number of 
institutions.  But this argument merely sidesteps the concern instead of 
addressing it. 
The more persuasive response is to consider another important 
legislative step that Congress has taken in the Dodd-Frank Act.  It has 
demonstrated a preference for ex ante solutions to systemic risk concerns.  
It has created a new systemic risk regulator: the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC).  The members of this body are the Secretary of 
the Treasury, the Chairman of the Fed‘s Board of Governors, the Chair of 
the FDIC, and the Director of the new Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection, as well as other federal and state regulators and an independent 
member with insurance expertise.
238
 
The FSOC may require nonbank financial companies to come under 
the supervision of the Fed if their failure could, by reason of their size, 
nature, or interconnectedness, pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.
239
  
Also, pursuant to a declaration of systemic risk,
240
 it may itself order the 
liquidation of failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to U.S. 
financial stability.  This must take place in a manner that mitigates risk and 
minimizes moral hazard.
241
 
A full analysis of the powers of the FSOC lies beyond the scope of 
this Article.  Suffice it to say that § 13(3) is no longer the chief legislative 
means of regulating systemic risks.  This role has now passed to another 
body established precisely for this purpose. 
D.  The way forward 
Kuttner argues that giving bailout duties to the Fed ―obscures its core 
objectives‖ and ―unnecessarily [links] monetary policy to the rescue of 
 
 238. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 
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failing institutions.‖
242
  The premise of this argument is that the Fed should 
only be a lender of last resort:  it should engage only in collateralized 
lending to solvent entities.  Throughout our analysis, we have seen that this 
restricted view of the Fed‘s § 13(3) powers finds strong textual support in 
the statute itself.  And Congress has now made it entirely clear that § 13(3) 
must only be used to respond to concerns about liquidity. 
But what of bailout duties?  Are they not – at least in some sense – 
inextricably linked with the Fed‘s core duties?  Its express goals in carrying 
out monetary policy are to maintain economic growth and to promote 
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest 
rates.
243
 
Even so, we have seen that there are strong arguments against the 
Fed‘s being able to protect the financial system by all conceivable means.  
It should not be able to lend against insufficient or no collateral.  Congress 
has now accepted these arguments.  The Fed retains its power to provide 
liquidity to the financial system.  And the FSOC now obtains the power to 
resolve systemically important nonbanks (as well as to require the Fed‘s 
supervision of such entities). 
Above, we have sought to argue that the advantage of moving asset 
purchase and unsecured lending powers away from § 13(3) and to some 
other legislation is that future decision-making is thus likely to occur under 
a more coherent and comprehensive set of rules.  And if any funds are to be 
used to aid insolvent institutions (a step that Congress has expressly 
rejected in the Dodd-Frank Act),
244
 they will have to be appropriated by a 
clear process. 
Two points remain to be made by way of conclusion.  The first is that 
the recent amendments to § 13(3) are to be welcomed.  They resolve a 
number of ambiguities in the statute.  They also realign the Fed‘s role with 
that of a central bank, classically conceived.  However, there may remain 
an ambiguity in the statute as to asset purchases.  The position taken in this 
Article is that these do not fall within the scope of § 13(3), and ideally 
should not, however broad-based a program of participation the Fed might 
decide to create.  Nevertheless, the amended rules about satisfactory 
collateral appear to mitigate many of the concerns raised.  Even so, it 
should also be pointed out that these legislative amendments only resolve 
concerns as to the future.  The effects of the Fed‘s past activity still remain. 
The second point is that the creation of a dedicated systemic risk 
regulator in the form of the FSOC, acting together with the Fed, is also to 
be welcomed.  If the FSOC is provided with a coherent set of principles by 
which to operate, the effect will be greater stability in decision-making than 
 
 242. See KUTTNER, supra note 219, at 12. 
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 244. See supra Part V.C.1. 
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was ever attainable under § 13(3). 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered the Federal Reserve‘s emergency 
decision-making during the financial crisis.  It has analyzed § 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act, a legislative power that the Fed used extensively 
when formulating its responses to the crisis. 
By way of background, it traced the historical development and use of 
this provision.  Next, it sought to assess its scope.  It concluded that at the 
time of the crisis, § 13(3) permitted the Fed to make secured loans to 
entities that could not obtain credit from other sources.  With this view of 
the statute in mind, it analyzed a number of the transactional structures that 
the Fed created during the financial crisis.  It concluded that the Fed‘s asset 
purchases and its loans against corporate shares exceeded the bounds of its 
statutory authority. 
Finally, it considered the intended purpose of the legislation:  the 
containment of systemic liquidity (rather than solvency) risks by means of 
secured lending against sufficient collateral.  It evaluated the reforms of § 
13(3) in the Dodd-Frank Act, and concluded that these are to be welcomed 
overall.  They set out a clear vision for § 13(3) and resolve a number of 
concerns.  Even so, an important ambiguity as to the Fed‘s ability to 
purchase assets remains in the law.  In closing, this Article then traced the 
authority of the FSOC, a new entity created by the Act that now acts 
together with the Fed in the sphere of systemic risk regulation. 
